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ABSTRACT 
We explore the bond “clustering” phenomenon, using a sample of bond issuances in 
2000-2015. Bond “clustering” is when the number of bonds issued that year exceeds three 
standard deviations above the mean number of issues for the firm over the sample period. We 
examine why firms opt for multiple issuances instead of a large one: exhaustion of debt capacity, 
refunding existing debt, timing favorable market conditions, managing working capital or 
financing profitable investment opportunities. Results indicate that firms do not cluster due to 
simply refinancing outstanding debt, but in order to manage their liquidity position and short-tern 
cash needs, to take advantage of the low interest rates, and to finance profitable investment.  
We examine if the firms’ corporate governance impacts new issues covenants. We find 
weak evidence of firms with corporate governance mechanisms that protect bondholders from 
excessive shareholder/manager risk-taking issuing bonds with fewer restrictive covenants 
(restrictive covenants indicate strong “bondholder governance” as defined by Cremers, Nair, and 
Wei (2007)), though they do not accrue benefits sufficient enough to lower yields on new issues.  
Using the financial crisis and the subsequent tightening of regulatory oversight over CRA 
industry, we investigate the changing influence of credit ratings updates and credit watch 
procedure on market reactions to credit downgrades pre- and post- the 2008 financial crisis, and 
the July, 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.  Market reactions to credit ratings downgrades and to downgrade 
credit watch initiation become less pronounced in the post-crisis post Dodd-Frank environment. 
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PART 1 
CORPORATE BOND ISSUE CLUSTERING  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms raise a significant proportion of new capital from the debt markets. Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) statistics show that total issuances of debt 
far exceed equity offerings. Between 2001 and 2015 over $3 trillion was issued in corporate equity 
through initial and secondary offers, while over $14 trillion was issued in corporate debt. The total 
value of the corporate bond market increased by approximately $3.6 trillion in the last decade due 
to new issues, while the growth in value of the equity market is mostly attributable to capital gains. 
Interestingly, new bonds are often issued in clusters, a pattern not seen in the equity market. 
While prior literature extensively addresses bond issuance determinants, bond issuance patterns 
remain unstudied. Bond clustering is a period of high issuance activity, which results from firms 
offering an abnormal number of bond issues in a year as opposed to one large issue 1. This paper 
examines bond clustering, and the reasons why some firms cluster bond issuances.  
Clustering is counterintuitive, presumably increasing the cost of debt financing for firms 
due to increased issuance costs. Clustering goes against fundamental research on determinants of 
corporate yields, starting with seminal work of Fisher (1959), who determines that “marketability” 
                                                     
1 We define cluster of bonds in any year with three standard deviations above the mean annual number of issues for 
the firm over the sample period. 
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(in modern terms, liquidity) of the bond is an important part of the risk premium2 and 
depends significantly on both the amount issued and outstanding.  
Although our definition of bond clustering is that of a firm specific issuance pattern, market 
wide periods of abnormal numbers of issuances without corresponding abnormal dollar volume 
(i.e. predominantly clustered issuances) are documented in SIFMA’s annual “Issuance in the US 
Bond Markets” reports, possibly pointing towards firms timing their bond issuances to favorable 
economic conditions.3  
<Insert Figure 1> 
This is the first paper to find that bigger, more profitable firms with larger amounts of debt 
outstanding tend to cluster their bond issuances, using the sample of 2,814 firms that issued debt 
between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2015. We also find that increased clustered issuance 
activity is exhibited when firms need funds to finance large investments, manage their liquidity, 
as well as take advantage of favorable low interest rate conditions. 
 Clustered issues are riskier, and potentially costlier for the firms, making the study of 
clustered issuance an important topic in corporate bond literature. There are several theories that 
                                                     
2 Bhagat and Frost (1986) also find significant economies of scale in issuance costs, such that firms tend to avoid 
small issues. More recent research supports these conclusions. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find 
that while default risk explains about a quarter of the variation in credit spreads, monthly credit spread changes are 
principally driven by local supply/demand shocks in the markets exacerbated by relatively low availability of issues 
inventory. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) also find evidence of a significant non-default component in corporate 
spreads strongly related to measures of bond-specific illiquidity such as the bid–ask spread and the outstanding 
principal amount. 
3 For example, SIFMA reports that about $795 billion in corporate debt was issued in the US annually in 2001-2004 
with an average of 1,009 firms issuing an average of 5,861 total issues per year during the period. For comparison, 
$1,036 billion in debt was issued annually in 2005-2007 by on average 917 firms in 3,951 issuances, i.e. an average 
firm issued fewer offerings with greater amount outstanding at issuance. Post-crisis 2009-2010 saw the average 
annual issuance of $1,012 billion of debt in an average 6,077 annual issuances by about 1,166 firms. For 
comparison, in 2012-2015 $1.5 trillion was issued annually by 1,129 firms in an average of 3,751 issuances, i.e. the 
average issue size has gone up more than twofold. Clustering of issuances became a phenomenon in 2001-2004 and 
2009-2010 time periods. See figure 1 for the graphic representation of the data.  
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may explain why some firms cluster debt issues: transitory debt adjustments, market timing, and 
liquidity considerations. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) propose that firms issue 
transitory debt for funding investments, and thus deviate from their permanent target leverage. 
They estimate a dynamic tradeoff model of capital structure where leverage reflects the sequence 
of investment outlays, i.e. when a profitable investment opportunity arises, firms issue significant 
amounts of debt, which may result in clustered issuances. Another implication of the transitory 
debt hypothesis, consistent with the clustered issuance pattern, is that issuance inactivity 
immediately follows clustered issuance years observed in the sample data. These inactivity periods 
allow firms to adjust debt to target levels to allow for accumulation of debt capacity to facilitate 
another investment in the future.  
Another theory tied to clustering of bonds is market timing. In their seminal survey of chief 
financial executives, Graham and Harvey (2001) discover that market timing is a primary 
consideration for the firms, and that CFOs are concerned about financial flexibility and current 
credit ratings when issuing debt. Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2002) arrive at the conclusion 
that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the capital markets. When 
market conditions are favorable to debt issuance (i.e. interest rates drop) firms may choose to issue 
more debt of various categories in clusters, making market timing important in explaining the 
pattern.  
Lastly, liquidity considerations may explain clustered issuances.  Huang and Ritter (2016) 
find that the immediate need for cash is the main reason for debt issuance and a large proportion 
of debt issuers would have run out of cash if they had not issued debt. Increases in net operating 
working capital, need to cover the due portion of long term debt or notes, and overall cash 
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deprivation may result in firms issuing debt in clusters as they use up their available debt capacity 
to manage immediate liquidity concerns. 
We find that firms cluster issuances for the purposes of financing large projects or taking 
advantage of interest rates movements to satisfy corporate cash needs.  This finding is consistent 
with the transitory debt hypothesis in conjunction with liquidity and market timing considerations 
as supplementing theories in explaining firm-level issuance variation.  
Furthermore, this paper determines specific characteristics that differentiate bonds issued 
in clusters from regular issuances. The analysis examines market quality of bond clusters: do these 
bonds display greater liquidity, higher overall and institutional trading activity or distinctively 
higher capital gains in the year following issuance? Using a sample of 70,836 bond issuances (both 
clustered and non-clustered) by 6,927 individual firms over the period of 2001–2015, we find that 
bonds issued in clusters have higher carrying costs (BBB or below rating), are more likely to have 
a floating coupon rate, be privately placed and be a pure discount issue, indicating a higher overall 
riskiness of clustered issues.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses 
about reasons firms cluster debt issuances, types of debt issued in clusters, and trading activity 
implications for clustered bonds. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 provides empirical results, 
and Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
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Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
 
Bond issuance clustering could be a capital structure decision or working capital and 
corporate liquidity management choice. Under the capital structure umbrella, we address the 
development of a dynamic tradeoff framework culminating in the transitory debt hypothesis and 
market timing hypothesis. We separately develop a set of testable implications for the working 
capital and cash liquidity choice. 
The dynamic tradeoff theory departs from the static tradeoff theory, which assumes that 
firms maintain target capital structure by constantly adjusting to stay at target level. In general, the 
dynamic tradeoff theory postulates that it may be suboptimal for firms to continuously adjust 
leverage due to costs associated with adjustment. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) model 
dynamic capital structure as a choice in the presence of recapitalization costs. They show that the 
optimal dynamic recapitalization policy is a function of firm-specific characteristics. Even small 
recapitalization costs lead to wide swings in a firm's debt ratio over time, as call premia and issue 
discount costs mitigate the agency problem of early recapitalization.  
Under the dynamic tradeoff theory firms weigh the benefit of being at their target leverage 
versus the cost to adjust to their target leverage. Firms make adjustments only if their leverage is 
out of the optimal range, thus leverage deviates from target levels until readjustment is reasonable 
(Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner, 1989). Using a dynamic duration model of firms' financing 
decisions, Leary and Roberts (2005) confirm that the main motivation behind actual leverage 
adjustments for firms is rebalancing their leverage to stay within an optimal range. Ovtchinnikov 
(2010) shows additional evidence in support of dynamic tradeoff theory on a sample of firms in 
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deregulated industries. In his sample, firms above their target leverage issue significantly more 
equity, and firms with prior leverage increases adjust their leverage down following deregulation.  
Dynamic tradeoff hypothesis predicts that periods of issuance inactivity follow events that 
cause departure from target leverage, because the benefit of adjustment is temporarily outweighed 
by the cost of it, resulting in the clustered issuances pattern observed in the data.4  
Hypothesis 1: Clustering of debt issuances exists, i.e. periods of high issuance activity are 
followed by periods of financing inactivity, induced by the presence of adjustment costs and 
representing passive restoration of the exhausted debt capacity.  
A recent extension of the traditional dynamic tradeoff theory, the transitory debt hypothesis 
provides an additional explanation for debt clustering. The transitory debt hypothesis of DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) aims to explain existing empirical inconsistencies in static models 
(such as Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)), and follows the dynamic capital structure 
models of Leary and Roberts (2005), Ovtchinnikov (2010), and others. For example, Strebulaev 
(2007) shows that if firms are allowed to increase debt in the future, they will opt for lower leverage 
initially, preserving debt capacity, resulting in average leverage higher than the leverage measured 
at refinancing points. The transitory debt hypothesis postulates that the opportunity costs of 
issuance (similar to that in Strebulaev (2007)) are also an important consideration.  
In DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited’s model leverage decisions (transitory debt issuance) 
reflect the sequence of investments outlays, allowing firms to deliberately deviate from permanent 
leverage targets by issuing transitory debt to fund investment. They find that the transitory debt 
                                                     
4 Myers (1984) postulates that if the costs of adjustments outweigh the benefits, firms will wait to recapitalize, 
resulting in "extended excursions away from their targets".  
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theory explains debt issuances/repayments and overall industry leverage better than existing 
tradeoff models, and also accounts for leverage changes accompanying investment spikes that 
occur in their sample.  
The transitory debt hypothesis postulates that when a firm borrows, the opportunity cost of 
its consequent future inability to borrow must be taken into account. Therefore, adjustment toward 
the target is also related to the nature of the firm’s investment opportunities, and happens when 
the investment needs are small, thus allowing the firm to free up finite debt capacity for future use. 
The target capital structure produced by the transitory debt hypothesis is more conservative than 
that obtained through traditional tradeoff models, because the cost of borrowing today includes the 
value lost when a firm fails to preserve the option to borrow later at comparable terms.  
While the theory does not explicitly predict debt clusters, it shows that firms incorporate 
opportunity costs of future borrowing into their financing decisions, so clustering can occur not 
only due to depleting firm’s debt capacity, but also because firms may choose to preserve some 
debt capacity in particular instruments and at different levels of capital costs. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) show that a firm returns to its target leverage range once shocks to 
its investment policy are absorbed by transitory debt, restoring the option to borrow later.  
The transitory debt hypothesis also suggests firms making large investments, such as 
merger and acquisition activity, utilize large bond issuances that devour the acquirer’s debt 
capacity, so it is possible that the acquirer issues multiple bond issues with an array of credit ratings 
producing bond issuance clusters. Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) examine the wealth effects of 
mergers and acquisitions on bondholders in the 1980s and 1990s. They find acquirers’ 
bondholders’ returns are negative, supporting the idea that the firm’s debt capacity is depleting. 
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Thus, if the deviations from target capital structure are due to financing large projects, such as 
mergers and acquisitions, then transitory debt may explain clustered issuances patterns for some 
firms.  
Hypothesis 2: Clustered bond issuances occur to support large investment opportunities 
that result in depletion of debt capacity (such as a merger or acquisition). 
If bonds are issued in clusters due to firms attempting to recuperate depleting debt capacity, 
then the features of the bonds may be different from those issued normally. They will likely be 
riskier due to issuers’ increasing probability of financial distress and, therefore, will attract a 
special category of investors, more sophisticated institutional market participants, who are willing 
to carry additional hazard of privately placed issues. The prevalence of Rule 144A bonds is 
expected, as are higher coupon rates, lower bond ratings or absence thereof. Additionally, the issue 
amount is of utmost importance. Beim (1992) finds that liquidity is positively priced in debt 
markets, such that newer bonds are more liquid and trading at lower yields. Chen, Lesmond, and 
Wei (2007) find that liquidity is priced into corporate yield spreads, i.e. better liquidity leads to 
cheaper possible financing opportunities. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Bonds within a cluster are issued in smaller dollar amounts and with 
higher yields, are more likely to be non-investment grade, unrated, or privately placed. 
An alternative view of capital structure that has been gaining traction in recent decades is 
that firms time the market when issuing securities. Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey of CFOs 
reports that market timing is a primary concern of corporate executives in their financing decisions. 
CFOs report that firms are concerned about financial flexibility and credit ratings when issuing 
debt, and earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation when issuing equity. 
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Market timing considerations have primarily been addressed in relation to equity issuance and the 
speed of adjustment to target leverage, and the results are inconclusive to date. 
Using the market-to-book ratio to measure market timing opportunities, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) find that high market valuations reduce leverage in the short run, and historically high 
market valuations are associated with lower leverage in the cross section. Baker and Wurgler also 
show that low (high) leverage firms raised equity funds when their valuations were high (low). 
They find that fluctuations in market valuations have large effects on capital structure persisting 
over a decade, and conclude that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to 
time the equity market. Welch (2004) also finds that equity price changes have a long-lasting effect 
on corporate capital structures. He concludes that stock returns are the primary determinant of 
capital structure changes and that corporate motives for net issuing are unclear. 
Additional evidence of market timing affecting capital structure is presented by Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003). They find that financially unconstrained firms time their issue choice to coincide 
with periods of favorable macroeconomic conditions, while constrained firms do not. Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003) find evidence that supports an argument that firms consider distance from target 
leverage and difference in marginal costs of issuance during issuance decision-making stage. Their 
results indicate that market timing may not have significant influence on the issuance patterns of 
financially constrained firms, but unconstrained firms time their issues to periods of relative 
favorable pricing of assets.   
Hypothesis 3: Bond issuance clustering occurs during years of low market valuations when 
firms lack the opportunity to issue equity “cheaply”. 
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Hypothesis 3.1: Bond issuance clustering occurs during the years of low market valuations 
when firms lack the opportunity to issue equity “cheaply”. The effect is most pronounced in 
financially unconstrained firms. 
Faulkender (2005) finds strong evidence of market timing in bond issuances, which 
depends on the shape of the yield curve. As the yield curve steepens, firms are more likely to have 
floating debt to reduce short-term interest payments. Consistent with higher interest rate volatility 
during economic downturns, firms are more likely to raise debt with fixed coupons as the yield 
curve flattens, and as the expectation of a recession increases.  The author stipulates that reducing 
short-term interest expense during times when fixed and floating rates are very different allows 
firms to report higher quarterly earnings. 
Hypothesis 4: Bond issuance clustering occurs during years of decreasing interest rates, 
and when the yield curve flattens, allowing firms to favorably time macroeconomic conditions. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Bonds issued in a cluster tend to have fixed rather than floating coupons. 
Interestingly, the interconnection between the parts of the “capital structure puzzle” allows 
for alternative interpretations of market timing considerations. Hovakimian (2006) reinterprets 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) results, claiming that historical weighted average market-to-book ratios 
are related to target leverage because they contain information about growth opportunities not 
captured by current market-to-book ratios and not due to past equity market timing. This result 
shows that even the presence of market timing evidence can be interpreted as the evidence of 
transitory debt issuance in order to support profitable investment, as opposed to the true managerial 
effort to take advantage of the market. The author finds no evidence of significant equity market 
timing for debt issues and debt reductions. 
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An altogether unrelated, although not mutually exclusive, explanation for bond issuance 
clustering exists. It is possible that clustering may occur due to a firm’s cash demands. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) show that, without Seasoned Equity Offer (SEO) proceeds, 62.6% of 
issuers in their sample would run out of cash (81.1% would have subnormal cash balances) the 
year after the SEO. This results shows that the near-term cash need is a primary motive for SEOs, 
with market-timing opportunities and lifecycle stage exerting only secondary influences. 
Concerning debt issuance, Huang and Ritter (2016) find that 86 cents of each dollar of debt 
financing is spent immediately. They argue that liquidity considerations and the immediate need 
for cash is the main reason for debt issuance. In their sample, 76.1% of net debt issuers would have 
run out of cash by the end of the issuing year without the debt issue, and spend almost all of the 
proceeds immediately. After controlling for market timing, precautionary savings, and corporate 
lifecycle motives, they also find that, to a lesser extent, cash need prompts companies to issue 
equity, as shown in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010).  
Hypothesis 5: Bond issuance clustering occurs in response to corporate cash needs in 
order to finance short-term liquidity.  
 
Data and Univariate Results 
 
Bond issuance data is obtained from Securities Data Company (SDC) and augmented by 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA’s) Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE) dataset, as well as CUSIP issuance data. The issuance sample covers the period from 
January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2016. A total of 70,836 issuances are obtained. Of the 70,836 
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bond issuances collected, 30,841 are bonds in clustered issuances (average of 362 bonds in a 
clustered year per firm) versus 39,995 bonds issued in a regular year (average 172 issuances per 
firm). An issue is identified as clustered every year the number of distinct offers of long-term debt 
instruments by the firm is in excess of three standard deviations of the average annual number of 
issuances over the entire period the firm is present in the sample.  
TRACE provides limited information on bond characteristics, and some of the information 
is incomplete as bonds were gradually phased into reporting compliance. Therefore, SDC is the 
primary source of issuance data, including bond features, coupon rate, maturity, call and sinking 
fund provisions. However, occasionally TRACE provides additional issuance information not 
presented in the SDC database. Compustat data is needed to investigate characteristics of firms 
that cluster issuances, constraining the sample to 2,814 firms.  All accounting variables are scaled 
by total assets in descriptive statistics and regression analyses as indicated. 
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for all firms in the sample. All accounting 
information reported by percent is scaled by Total Assets and represents data in common-size 
approach.5 Table 1.1 contrasts statistics for firms that cluster issuances at least once (2,516 firms) 
against firms that are not classified as clusterers (298 firms) over the sample period. A bond cluster 
is any fiscal year during which the number of bonds issued is three standard deviations above the 
mean number of issuances for the firm over the sample period. An average clustering firm is bigger 
($26.94 billion in Total Assets versus $12.38 billion for non-clusterer), has a greater amount of 
debt outstanding and a larger portion of long term debt due in the next fiscal year ($557.60 million 
versus $329.00 million for non-clusterer or 3.23% versus 2.56% respectively). Hence, clustering 
                                                     
5 Scaled variables are Long Term Debt, Long Term Debt due in one/two years, Increase in Short Term Investments, 
Increase in Cash and Equivalents, Increase in NOWC. Dollar amounts are not presented in the current version of the 
paper and are available in a table form upon request. 
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may occur naturally as the result of refunding operations. Clustering firms are slightly older (by 
about two years), which may be indicative of the fact that sooner or later most firms will resort to 
clustering their bond issuances. On average, clustering firms also carry larger cash reserves in the 
form of short-term investments ($1.7 billion versus $579.6 million for non-clusterers), and 
experience greater increases in Cash (by154.6%), Short-Term Investments (by 29.16%), and Net 
Operating Working Capital (NOWC) (by 5.27%). 
Further, table 1.2 separates clusterers’ annual observations into years of clustered and non-
clustered issuance to see any inherent differences in accounting information conditional upon 
issuance patterns. In years of clustered issuances, firms experience increases in NOWC of about 
$90 million (2.1%) as compared to a modest increase of $5 million (0.29%) in a regular year. Firms 
have smaller amounts of long term debt outstanding ($3.9 billion versus $4.7 billion, leverage ratio 
of 30.84% versus 25.49%) and due in the next fiscal period ($616.6 million versus $837.1 million, 
or 3.07% versus 2.81% scaled by Total Assets), which may point to greater available debt capacity 
and away from refunding operations as a possible explanation. Proceeds of debt issuances are 
reported as cash and equivalents on the balance sheet ($224 million or 1.5% increase in cash than 
in non-clustered year) and extra cash is converted into short-term investments ($207 million or 
0.5% increase compared to a regular year). 
Table 1.3 provides specific observations on the characteristics of bonds classified as issued 
in clusters versus regular issuances. Clustered bond issuances are on average over $450,000 less 
in total par value, with slightly longer maturities, and have a 0.84% higher coupon (more likely to 
be high-yield) than non-clustered issuances.  However, these bonds are more likely to be zero 
coupon (the seeming contradiction is due to the fact that zero coupon bonds are identified by a 
dummy variable, and the average coupon rate is only measured for coupon-bearing bonds), and 
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callable, but less likely to be a senior bond or have a floating coupon, further indicating prevalence 
of high-yield issues in clusters, which provides support for hypothesis 4.1, indicating that bonds 
issued in a cluster tend to have fixed rather than floating coupons  
Data presented in the first three tables of this paper provides support to hypothesis 1: 
clustered issuances exist and, in fact, differ from regular issuances. The preliminary findings in 
table 1.3 are also consistent with Faulkender’s (2005) results on timing of short-term interest 
savings and in support of hypothesis 3. Consistent with higher cost of interest rate volatility during 
economic downturns, firms are more likely to raise debt with fixed coupons as the yield curve 
flattens, and as the expectation of a recession increases. Clustered bond issuance in the sample is 
most prevalent during 2010 – 2014, where the yield curve is the flat. Floating coupons are less 
prevalent in clustered issuances, preliminarily supporting hypothesis 4.1.  
 Clustered bonds are more likely to be privately placed, which falls in line with higher 
coupon and greater proportion of high-yield bonds in the category, as the Rule 144A bond market 
is reserved for sophisticated institutional investors, who are expected to be able to carry out due 
diligence in-house and who do not rely on information provided by the firm. According to 
hypothesis 2 clustered bond issuances indicate depletion of debt capacity. The results in table 1.3 
indicate that the bonds within a cluster are issued in smaller dollar amounts and with higher yields, 
are more likely to be non-investment grade or unrated, as well as privately placed, providing full 
support for hypothesis 2.1. 
Since discussion of liquidity implications for clustered issuances is one of the possible 
extensions of the results presented in this paper, it is interesting to observe that some liquidity 
determinants are characteristics of clustered bonds. Petrasek (2012) shows positive liquidity 
 15 
 
implications for multimarket traded bonds. Listing and trading bonds on an exchange provides 
additional benefits of a wider investor base. Clustered bonds are less likely to be listed on NYSE, 
but out of 422 globally listed and traded bonds in the sample, 186 were issued in a cluster, i.e. 
about 5.991% of the clustered bonds were listed versus 3.88% of non-clustered bonds. 
 
Multivariate Results 
 
Table 1.4 provides estimates of multivariate regressions on differences between firms with 
and without clustered issuances. We examine the impact of the firms’ history of clustering 
behavior on their market valuation, capital structure, and investments using the following:  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+2  +  𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The results of our regression analyses show that firm that cluster debt issues are larger in 
market value terms (column [1], Market Value), carry a greater amount of debt (column [2], Long 
Term Debt), produce more revenue (column [3], Revenue), with positive coefficients on the main 
variable of interest, Firm-clusterer. We find no significant evidence that firm-clusterers invest 
more in fixed assets, compared to firms that do not cluster their issuances, (column [4], CapEx). 
However, results in column [5] (dependent variable – Acquisition) show that firms that cluster debt 
issues acquire more or produce larger acquisition cash flows than firms that do not (indicator 
variable Firm-clusterer is positive and significant). This result provides additional indirect support 
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for the transitory debt hypothesis of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited postulated in hypothesis 2. 
Additionally, as is later revealed in table 1.7, when firms that cluster debt issues acquire, this 
extraordinary event forces them to exhaust their debt capacity to support a profitable undertaking 
as predicted by the transitory debt hypothesis.  
Table 1.5 provides evidence on cash increases after debt issuance and subsequent decreases 
in the year following clustered issuances, showing that clustered issuances are different from 
ordinary issuances and are therefore important to study:  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+2  +  𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8#𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 +
𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Results in Panel A show that cash increases by $456 million in the year of clustered 
issuance [1] and is spent over the fiscal period as next year cash decreases significantly by $302 
million as presented in column [1] of Panel B. Similar results is observed in short-term 
investments, which absorb excess cash in the year of issuances [2]. Panel A (increase of $336.9 
million), and are converted into cash and spent the following year, see column [2] of Panel B 
(decrease of $247.82 million). While not all cash is spent immediately, it is important to note that 
clustered issuances rarely follow each other, as clustered issuance potentially represents 
consumption of the available debt capacity. It is important to uncover how raised capital is spent 
and why the firms moved to expend the valuable opportunity to issue debt later. 
Table 1.6 presents preliminary results of debt issuance cash proceeds usage:  
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𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+2  +  𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7#𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
According to DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2001), the exhaustion of debt capacity 
occurs due to the presence of lucrative investment opportunities that require a large investment. 
The transitory debt hypothesis postulates that debt is issued to fund profitable investment 
opportunities, and regressions in columns [1] and [2] aim to address investment. Investment 
avenues may take the form of large capital expenditures for expansion, mergers and acquisition 
activity, or large investment into research and development. While firms do not seem to increase 
their capital expenditures in years of clustered issuance, they use proceeds to acquire other firms 
(including minority interest). Acquisitions (column [2]) are significantly and positively related to 
clustered debt issuance. Value of acquisition assets is separated from capital expenditures (CapEx).  
The increase in NOWC observed in table 1.5, Panel A, column [3] is primarily driven by 
changes in cash balances explored above. Also, results in Panel B of table 1.5 indicate that firms 
manage their working capital/liquidity through cash from clustered debt. The results in table 1.6 
show that in the year of clustered issuance firms significantly decrease their trade payables [3] (by 
$759 million) without significant changes in other categories of payables (unreported results). This 
result indicates additional support for hypothesis 5, and show that firms use cash raised from 
clustered debt to manage their short-term liquidity.  
While results reported in table 1.3 provides support for the transitory debt hypothesis and 
liquidity considerations in issuing clustered debt, further investigation of market timing 
(hypotheses 3 and 4) is required. The greatest number of clustered bonds is issued during and 
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immediately post-crisis, in years 2008-2014.6 The first wave of crisis-related clustered issuances 
coincides with dramatic reduction in the Federal Funds Rate over the second half of calendar year 
2007, which resulted in significantly lowered yields on corporate bonds and a flattened yield curve, 
providing firms with a great market timing opportunity. 
Table 1.7 presents the results of modelling the probability of a clustered issuance year with 
a probit regression incorporating all the variables with power to explain clustering gathered from 
preliminary analysis:  
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  +  𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+2  +  𝛽5𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                    [1] 
The coefficients on Age and Long-Term Debt are positive, indicating that the initial 
conclusions that firms clustering their issues are slightly older and more leveraged hold. Clustering 
of issuances is also not likely a simple outcome of refunding operations, since the coefficient on 
Long-Term Debt due in One Year is insignificant, and the coefficient on Long-Term Debt due in 
Two Years is significant and negative, meaning that impeding maturity of a portion of the 
outstanding long-term debt does not increase the probability of a clustered issuance.  
More importantly, it is evident that firms resort to issuing clustered debt due to an imminent 
profitable investment opportunity. The coefficient on Acquisition is positive. The transitory debt 
hypothesis (hypothesis 2) finds additional support in the fact that regular project financing through 
Capital Expenditures does not have any predictive power over the occurrence of clustered 
issuance. 
                                                     
6 SIFMA Research Department, 2016, US Corporate Bond Issuance Report 
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Column [2] in table 1.7 sheds lights on liquidity considerations that influence clustered 
bond issuances:  
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  +  𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+2  +  𝛽5𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝛥𝑁𝑂𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝛥𝑆𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                         [2] 
Firms issue clustered debt to manage their liquidity positions and short-tern cash needs 
(hypothesis 5), but extending trade credit is not related to clustered issuance (Trade Receivables 
coefficient is insignificant). Trade related Accounts Payable (positive effect on the probability of 
clustered issuance) may indicate that excessive payables prompt firms to issue clustered debt in a 
cash crunch. Change in NOWC is mostly attributable to changes in cash balances and short-term 
investments. These results provide partial support for hypothesis 5, but additional investigation of 
cash use following clustered issuance is warranted as suggested by univariate results in table 1.3. 
Column [3] aims to test hypothesis 4 related to market timing, and explicitly examines the 
effects of economy-wide interest rate environment on bond issuance clustering: 
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  +  𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+2  +  𝛽5𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                           
[3] 
We find no decisive support for market timing considerations playing a major role in firms’ 
decisions to issue multiple bonds in a short time. Firms are less likely to issue clustered debt in the 
years of Federal Funds decrease or increase relative to no change years (Interest Rates Decline/ 
Increase variables is negative). These results indicate lack of support for hypothesis 4, firms do 
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not issue more clustered bonds in years of downward interest rate change. In the current sample, 
years of no change in the interest rate environment coincide with the latest economic recession. 
According to SIFMA Issuance Report, firms are very active in issuing corporate debt in 2010-
2014. During that time, the slope of the yield curve is fairly steep in anticipation of future interest 
rates increases, which may prompt companies to issue more debt throughout the slow economic 
recovery period. In our sample, 2010-2014 are the years in which clustered issuance is most likely, 
possibly supporting Faulkender (2005) conclusions about managerial market timing. The first 
significant increase in interest rates occurs in 2015 and there is not yet enough data to draw 
conclusions about the post-recession period. Further investigation is warranted. 
 Column [4] combines all the explanatory variables presented in the previous models and 
shows that large investments and short-term liquidity considerations push firms to issue clustered 
debt. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the bond issuance pattern of “clustering”. If the number of bonds 
issued by a firm in a fiscal year is three standard deviations above the firm’s mean number of bond 
issues, we deem that year a bond issuance cluster year. This measure allows for identifying years 
of extraordinary circumstances, forcing firms to opt for multiple issuances instead of a single one, 
which indicates potential exhaustion of their debt capacity. Bonds issued in clusters display a great 
degree of heterogeneity in their features, and a large proportion of clustered bonds is non-rated or 
rated below BBB, further suggesting firms’ depleted capacity of issuing low interest debt.  
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Further analysis reveals that clustered issuances coincide with years of merger and 
acquisition activity, an outcome predicted by the transitory debt hypothesis of DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Whited (2001). Firms also use proceeds of clustered issuances to manage their 
liquidity positions, extending greater trade credit to their customers, and lowering the balance of 
their trade payables. These results are in direct agreement with Huang and Ritter’s (2016) findings 
that immediate cash needs are the primary motive for debt issuances. In their sample, a two 
standard deviation increase in free cash flow-to-assets, on average, decreases the likelihood of a 
net debt issue in that year by 53.6%.  
Our estimations of probit regressions suggest that firms issue clustered debt in order to 
finance profitable investment opportunities as predicted in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Whited (2001). 
Additionally, firms use clustered issuances to provide cash for immediate operations and due to 
market timing considerations. The most fruitful years for clustered bond issuances are during the 
economic recovery period of 2010-2014. 
Overall, studying clustered bond issuances is warranted by the exclusive containment of 
this phenomenon to bond markets. Issuance patterns of this nature are not exhibited in equities. 
The plethora of debt instruments available for financing provides for additional interest in studying 
bond clusters. Bond clusters tend to consist of smaller issues, which contain a greater degree of 
heterogeneity and complexity in their features, more likely to be privately placed, carry a non-
investment grade denomination and, consequently, have a higher coupon. Clustering is not 
explained simply by the process of refunding outstanding debt, and serves a purpose to 
management. Clustering allows greater liquidity in operating working capital of the firm, cheaper 
financing in anticipation of interest rate increases, and provides an opportunity for the firms to take 
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advantage of profitable investment (merger and acquisition activity) as their debt capacity is 
depleted. 
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Table 1.1 
Sample statistics for all firms in the sample 
The table presents differences in means of various accounting and investor related metrics between the firms exhibiting 
clustering behavior during the sample vs. non-clusterers. All accounting measures (designated as %) are scaled by total 
assets (Compustat item # 6 – AT) 
 # Observations Difference in means 
Firm level (all firms) Clusterer Non-Clusterer Clusterer Non-Clusterer Difference 
Size (Total Assets) ($, mln) 2,491 283 26,944.40 12,384.30 14,560.1*** 
Market Capitalization ($, mln) 2,029 221 79,047.10 46,135.20 32,912.1*** 
Long-Term Debt (%) 2,491 292 27.37 29.59 -2.22* 
Long-Term Debt Due in One Year (%) 2,459 278 3.23 2.56 -0.68* 
Long-Term Debt Due in Two Years (%) 2,135 250 2.73 2.42 0.32 
Average # Bonds Per Year 2,516 298 3.92 2.16 1.76*** 
Age (yrs) 1,204 167 9.04 7.25 1.79*** 
Ordinary Dividends ($, mln) 1,436 158 1.07 0.97 0.103 
Short-Term Investments ($, mln) 2,484 281 1,791.3 579.60 1,211.7*** 
Increase in Short-Term Investments (%) 2,107 237 35.22 6.06 29.16** 
Increase in Cash and Equivalents (%) 2,391 271 161.20 6.64 154.6* 
Increase in NOWC (%) 1,888 237 2.23 -3.04 5.27** 
Total observations 2,516 298    
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Table 1.2 
Sample statistics for firms that clustered issuances during the sample period 
The table presents differences in means of various accounting metrics between clustered years (>3σ of average number of bond 
issuances by the firm) vs. years of average issuance. The table only contains data on the firms that exhibited clustered issuance 
behavior at least once during the sample period. All accounting measures are scaled by total assets. 
 # Observations Difference in means 
Firm-year level (clusterer firms) Clustered year Non-Clustered year Clustered Non-Clustered Difference 
Average # Bonds Per Year 3,186 28,126 5.14 1.71 3.41*** 
Long-Term Debt Total (%) 4,499 25,899 30.84 25.49 5.35*** 
Long-Term Debt Due in One Year (%) 4,213 24,318 3.07 2.81 0.26 
Long-Term Debt Due in Two Years (%) 3,296 18,617 2.11 2.68 -0.57*** 
Capital Expenditures (%) 4,126 23,817 5.43 5.45 -0.02 
NOWC (%) 3,324 17,347 2.10 0.29 1.81* 
Change in Cash and Equivalents (%) 4,382 22,965 1.48 -0.032 1.51*** 
Change in Short-Term Investments (%) 4,362 22,827 0.446 -0.044 0.49*** 
Total Revenue (%) 4,499 25,888 67.71 70.48 -2.77** 
Interest Expense (%) 4,431 25,258 328.40 422.30 -93.90** 
Net Income (%) 4,232 24,557 430.70 521.10 -90.35** 
Total Volume Traded, Equity (mln) 3,662 19,638 4787.764 5,300.20 -512.434** 
Average Stock Price ($) 3,662 19,638 37.16 37.61 0.45 
Total Dividends Paid, per share ($) 2,213 11,769 1.09 1.04 0.05* 
Total observations 4,458 26,754    
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  Table 1.3 
Sample statistics for all bonds in the sample (of firm clusterers and non-clusterers) 
The table presents differences in various bond features, complexity and callability between bonds issued in clusters vs. bonds 
of average issuance. The table contains data on all firms that issued bonds during the sample period. 
Panel A. All Bonds   
 # Observations Difference in means 
 
Clustered 
Issuance 
Non-Clustered 
Issuance Clustered 
Non-
Clustered Difference 
Issuance Amount ($, mln) 4,479 7,166 1,707.3 2,164.00 -456.74** 
Coupon Rate 24,743 35,267 5.08% 4.24% 0.84%*** 
Fixed coupon (vs. floating) 27,962 36,729 0.718 0.7283 -0.0103*** 
Zero coupon (vs. non-zero) 24,743 35,267 0.179 0.1382 0.0408*** 
Callable 20,971 32,061 0.5042 0.4853 0.0189*** 
Senior (vs. subordinated) 20,826 31,909 0.3577 0.3622 -0.0044 
High-yield (vs. Investment Grade) 30,841 39,995 0.7257 0.5338 0.1919*** 
Listed on NYSE (vs. all the rest) 30,841 39,995 0.096 0.1462 -0.0502*** 
Listed Globally (vs. NYSE-listed only) 3,145 6,080 0.0591 0.0388 0.0203*** 
Rule 144A 30,841 39,995 0.1934 0.1274 0.066*** 
Maturity at issuance (in years) 22,430 32,582 10.7412 10.215 0.5261*** 
# bonds issued by the firm in a year 30,841 39,995 362.3 172 190.7*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3
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Table 1.3 – continued  
Panel B. All Bonds. Difference-in-medians 
 # Observations Difference-in-medians 
 
Clustered 
Issuance 
Non-Clustered 
Issuance 
Clustered 
Non-
Clustered 
Pearson χ2 p-value 
Issuance Amount ($ mln) 4,479 7,166 400 500.00 154.5274 <0.0001 
Coupon Rate 24,743 35,267 5.13% 4.06% 844.9282 <0.0001 
Fixed coupon (vs. floating) 27,962 36,729 1 1 . . 
Zero coupon (vs. non-zero) 24,743 35,267 0 0 185.0365 <0.0001 
Callable 20,971 32,061 1 0 18.0343 <0.0001 
Senior (vs. subordinated) 20,826 31,909 0 0 1.0532 0.305 
High-yield (vs. Investment Grade) 30,841 39,995 1 1 . . 
Listed on NYSE (vs. all the rest) 30,841 39,995 0 0 401.9556 <0.0001 
Listed Globally (vs. NYSE-listed only) 3,145 6,080 0 0 0.0498 0.823 
Rule 144A 30,841 39,995 0 0 574.5963 <0.0001 
Maturity at issuance (in years) 22,430 32,582 8 8 2.4365 0.119 
# bonds issued by the firm in a year 30,841 39,995 15 29 183.8223 <0.0001 
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Table 1.3 – continued  
Panel C. Bonds issued within clusters only. Difference-in-means 
 # Observations Difference in means 
 
Below Median 
Offer Amount 
Above Median 
Offer Amount 
Below Median 
Offer Amount 
Above Median 
Offer Amount Difference 
Issuance Amount ($ mln) 2,392 2,087 207.59 3,426.16 -3,218.57*** 
Coupon Rate 2,392 2,087 5.4246 4.5050 0.9195*** 
Fixed coupon (vs. floating) 2,392 2,087 0.8976 0.9374 -0.0398*** 
Zero coupon (vs. non-zero) 2,392 2,087 0.0326 0.0551 -0.0226*** 
Callable 2,392 2,087 0.8507 0.8136 0.0371*** 
Senior (vs. subordinated) 2,392 2,087 0.6971 0.5963 0.1009*** 
High-yield (vs. Investment Grade) 2,392 2,087 0.6798 0.4485 0.2313*** 
Listed on NYSE (vs. all the rest) 2,392 2,087 0.0033 0.0120 -0.0086*** 
Listed Globally (vs. NYSE-listed only) 2,392 2,087 0.0105 0.0292 -0.0188*** 
Rule 144A 2,392 2,087 0.3637 0.3934 -0.0297** 
Maturity at issuance (in years) 2,392 2,087 11.5523 10.2631 1.2892*** 
# bonds issued by the firm in a year 2,392 2,087 10.9661 42.8769 -31.9107*** 
  
  
3
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Table 1.3 – continued  
Panel D. All bonds. Annualized Issuance Data. Difference-in-means 
 # Observations Difference in means 
 Clustered Non-Clustered Clustered Non-Clustered Difference 
Issuance Amount ($ mln) 8,178 8,965 734.30 849.35 -115.05** 
Coupon Rate 8,178 8,965 6.40 5.60 0.80*** 
Fixed coupon (vs. floating) 8,178 8,965 0.87 0.92 -0.05*** 
Zero coupon (vs. non-zero) 8,178 8,965 0.07 0.05 0.02*** 
Callable 8,178 8,965 0.69 0.73 -0.04*** 
Senior (vs. subordinated) 8,178 8,965 0.67 0.62 0.06*** 
High-yield (vs. Investment Grade) 8,178 8,965 0.77 0.59 0.18*** 
Listed on NYSE (vs. all the rest) 8,178 8,965 0.03 0.06 -0.03*** 
Listed Globally (vs. NYSE-listed only) 8,178 8,965 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Rule 144A 8,178 8,965 0.32 0.21 0.11*** 
Maturity at issuance (in years) 8,178 8,965 14.29 12.15 2.15*** 
# bonds issued by the firm in a year 8,178 8,965 4.63 6.70 -2.07*** 
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Table 1.4 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firms’ history of clustering behavior (Panel A: Firm-
Clusterer Indicator = 1, if there is a record of firm clustering its issuances over the sample 
period, and 0 otherwise; Panel B: Cluster Indicator=1, if bonds are issued in cluster during the 
fiscal year) on their performance, capital structure and investment. All accounting variables are 
scaled by total assets. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from standard 
errors clustered by the industry (first 2 digits of the appropriate SIC code) and year, ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
Panel A. All Firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Market 
Value 
Long-Term 
Debt  
Revenue CapEx Acquisition 
Total Assets 
0.0919 0.0476*** 0.0746*** -0.00100 0.00206 
(0.85) (4.25) (3.17) (-0.41) (1.37) 
Long-Term Debt Due 
in One Year 
-0.938*** 0.384 -0.622** -0.0611* -0.0943*** 
(-3.81) (1.43) (-2.48) (-1.66) (-3.50) 
Long-Term Debt Due 
in Two Years 
-0.474 3.054*** 0.248 -0.0246 0.0826 
(-0.39) (11.45) (0.35) (-0.34) (1.44) 
Long-Term Debt Total 
-0.00833 
 
0.125 0.0622*** 0.0317*** 
(-0.03) 
 
(0.88) (3.16) (2.89) 
Total Revenue  
0.451*** 0.0125 
 
0.0495*** 0.00226 
(3.71) (0.92) 
 
(5.23) (0.88) 
Short-Term 
Investments 
0.442 -0.0388 -0.153* -0.0212* -0.0278*** 
(0.66) (-0.85) (-1.87) (-1.77) (-3.83) 
Capital Expenditures 
3.571*** 0.665*** 5.285*** 
 
-0.0426 
(2.98) (3.24) (6.96) 
 
(-1.49) 
Net Income 
4.015** -0.141* 1.834*** 0.0702** 0.0506*** 
(2.52) (-1.67) (3.01) (2.19) (3.26) 
Firm-Clusterer 
Indicator 
846.5* 107.7* 616.6** 52.99 27.04* 
(1.96) (1.96) (1.98) (0.81) (1.72) 
Industry and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,654 23,287 23,287 23,287 19,383 
adj. R2 0.655 0.883 0.579 0.526 0.115 
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Table 1.4 – continued  
Panel B. Firm-Clusterers only. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Market Value Long-Term Debt  Revenue CapEx Acquisition 
Total Assets 
0.0862 0.0476*** 0.0707*** -0.000922 0.00204 
(0.83) (4.21) (3.03) (-0.38) (1.35) 
Long-Term Debt 
Due in One Year 
-1.029*** 0.384 -0.600** -0.0596 -0.0966*** 
(-3.66) (1.41) (-2.39) (-1.61) (-3.50) 
Long-Term Debt 
Due in Two Years 
-0.534 3.053*** 0.310 -0.0216 0.0830 
(-0.45) (11.39) (0.41) (-0.30) (1.43) 
Long-Term Debt 
Total 
0.0396 
 
0.117 0.0593*** 0.0332*** 
(0.13) 
 
(0.81) (2.98) (2.83) 
Total Revenue  
0.360*** 0.0120 
 
0.0489*** 0.00101 
(2.62) (0.85) 
 
(5.03) (0.37) 
Short-Term 
Investments 
0.396 -0.0389 -0.144* -0.0203* -0.0282*** 
(0.65) (-0.85) (-1.79) (-1.75) (-3.87) 
Capital Expenditures 
3.391*** 0.644*** 5.170*** 
 
-0.0372 
(2.67) (2.98) (7.01) 
 
(-1.25) 
Net Income 
5.553** -0.128 2.158*** 0.0779** 0.0571** 
(2.53) (-1.33) (3.22) (2.05) (2.46) 
Cluster Indicator 
341.8 37.28 269.9* -23.48 102.7*** 
(0.92) (0.52) (1.66) (-1.02) (4.24) 
Industry and Time 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 15,054 21,050 21,050 21,050 17,581 
adj. R2 0.694 0.884 0.591 0.526 0.103 
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Table 1.5 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firms’ concurrent (Panel A) or prior (Panel B) clustering 
behavior (Cluster (or Last Year Cluster) = 1, if this or last year displayed a clustered issuance, 
and 0 otherwise) on their cash flow and investment in short-term working capital. All accounting 
variables are scaled by total assets. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from 
standard errors clustered by individual firm and year, ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Δ Cash and 
Equivalents 
Δ Short-Term 
Investments 
ΔNOWC 
Size (Total Assets)  
-0.0238*** -0.0258*** 0.0086*** 
(-6.58) (-7.67) (3.39) 
Long-Term Debt Due in One 
Year 
-0.3851*** -0.2457*** 0.0591*** 
(-8.38) (-5.65) (2.59) 
Long-Term Debt Due in Two 
Years 
0.4324*** 0.4638*** -0.1687*** 
(4.94) (5.59) (-6.31) 
Long-Term Debt Total 
-0.1426*** -0.2088*** -0.0098 
(-6.75) (-10.48) (-1.54) 
Capital Expenditures 
  -0.0683*** 
  (-4.1) 
Total Revenue  
0.0447*** 0.0567*** -0.011*** 
(4.14) (5.47) (-5.18) 
Net Income 
0.1172*** 0.1090*** 0.0447*** 
(3.39) (3.33) (7.43) 
# Bonds Issued in Current Year 
-47.066*** -49.314*** -4.306 
(-9.43) (-10.47) (-1.44) 
Cluster 
456.01*** 336.946** 106.644*** 
(166.238) (2.13) (3.88) 
Stock and Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,114 2,108 1,865 
N 19,891 19,546 17,376 
adj. R2 0.1273 0.1224 0.0842 
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Table 1.5 – continued  
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Δ Cash and 
Equivalents 
Δ Short-Term 
Investments 
ΔNOWC 
Size (Total Assets)  
-0.0103*** -0.0042* 0.0070*** 
(-3.7) (1.7) (2.8) 
Long-Term Debt Due in One Year 
-0.1695*** -0.0483 0.0610*** 
(-3.81) (-1.16) (2.73) 
Long-Term Debt Due in Two Years 
0.1591* 0.2958*** -0.1619*** 
(1.85) (3.67) (-6.21) 
Long-Term Debt Total 
-0.1824*** -0.2234*** -0.107* 
(-8.6) (-11.29) (-1.73) 
Capital Expenditures 
  -0.0683*** 
  (-4.16) 
Total Revenue  
0.0216** 0.0405*** -0.0102*** 
(2.00) (3.95) (-4.86) 
Net Income 
0.1518*** 0.1395*** 0.0431*** 
(4.38) (4.30) (7.26) 
# Bonds Issued in Current Year 
-50.739*** -62.0414*** -0.6929 
(-9.99) (-13.07) (-0.26) 
Last Year Cluster  
-301.905** -247.8238* -45.0634** 
(-1.97) (-1.72) (-1.96) 
Stock and Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 19,891 19,546 17,376 
adj. R2 0.1174 0.1303 0.0849 
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Table 1.6 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firms’ clustering behavior (Cluster = 1, if current year 
displayed a clustered issuance, and 0 otherwise) on their fixed capital expenditures, 
acquisitions, and trade credit management. All accounting variables are scaled by total 
assets. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered 
by individual firm and year, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CapEx Acquisitions AP-trade 
AR-
trade 
Size (Total Assets) 
0.0015 0.0015 0.196** 0.0758 
(0.09) (0.90) (2.03) (1.26) 
Long-Term Debt Due in One Year 
-0.0535** -0.0711* -1.075 -0.488 
(-2.54) (-1.77) (-1.59) (-1.34) 
Long-Term Debt Due in Two Years 
-0.0672** 0.0694 1.863*** 2.485*** 
(-2.15) (1.39) (2.94) (3.90) 
Long-Term Debt Total 
0.0419*** 0.00590 -0.226 0.192 
(2.95) (0.46) (-1.19) (1.53) 
Total Revenue 
0.0501*** 0.00985*** -0.0971 -0.0321 
(5.12) (2.58) (-1.24) (-0.68) 
Net Income 
-1.928 -0.697 292.6*** -98.74* 
(-1.02) (-0.52) (4.54) (-1.78) 
# Bonds Issued in Current Year 
0.0170 0.0161* -0.0736 -0.0243 
(1.08) (1.73) (-0.56) (-0.29) 
Cluster 
2.847 103.1*** -758.9*** 342.5 
(0.23) (3.76) (-2.84) (1.50) 
Stock and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 18,699 17,793 18,455 17,925 
adj. R2 0.258 0.331 0.385 0.332 
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Table 1.7 
We use a probit regression to examine the impact of the firm’s short-term liquidity and 
trade credit management, long-term debt reissuance, and market timing on the 
probability of firm resorting to a clustered issuance (dependent variable is Cluster = 1, if 
a year displayed a clustered issuance, and 0 otherwise). All accounting variables are 
scaled by total assets. Wald Chi statistics are reported in parentheses, ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 
0.0087*** 0.0083** 0.0016 0.0055** 
(16.30) (11.88) (0.64) (4.68) 
Size (Total Assets)  
-0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** 
(0.009) (1.47) (0.01) (4.84) 
Long-Term Debt Due in One 
Year 
0.1348 0.4337 0.2787 0.4644 
(0.27) (2.48) (2.07) (2.57) 
Long-Term Debt Due in 
Two Years 
-1.8568*** -1.5728*** -1.9871*** -1.5495*** 
(28.34) (20.71) (37.32) (19.68) 
Long-Term Debt Total 
0.7853*** 0.9465*** 0.7353*** 0.9232*** 
(135.20) (166.47) (141.19) (152.01) 
Net Income 
0.0872 -0.0608 0.0475 -0.0605 
(1.34) (0.47) (0.58) (0.45) 
Capital Expenditures 
-0.0002   0.0000 
(1.78)   (0.09) 
Acquisitions 
0.0043**   0.0136*** 
(5.89)   (18.26) 
ΔNOWC 
 0.426***  0.4259*** 
 (36.25)  (35.14) 
ΔCash 
 0.5882***  0.6254*** 
 (30.25)  (33.04) 
ΔShort-Term Investments 
 0.6791***  0.5557** 
 (10.11)  (6.39) 
Trade Receivables  
-0.0001  0.0000 
 (1.086)  (0.01) 
Trade Payables  
0.0004**  0.00045** 
 (5.89)  (5.65) 
Interest Rates Decline   
-0.419*** -0.3017*** 
  (111.34) (41.30) 
Interest Rates Increase   
-0.1643*** -0.1957*** 
    (19.20) (16.28) 
N 8,205 7,018 9,770 6,692 
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.033 0.033 0.045 
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FIGURE 1.1. BOND ISSUANCE PATTERN 1990-2015 
 
 
Pattern of bond issuances over the sample period. The sample includes observations on 108,302 
issuances by 9,235 individual firms over the period of 1990-2015.
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PART 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BOND TRADING 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance aims to encourage management to work in shareholders’ best 
interests. This is attempted by a system of internal mechanisms such as strong boards, audit, 
blockholdings, etc., as well as external governance like government regulations or takeovers.  
Since managers are supposed to work in shareholders’ best interests, there exists an 
inherent conflict between bondholders and managers/shareholders, which is not addressed by most 
traditional corporate governance mechanisms. Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) introduce the 
concept of “bondholder governance” exercised through restrictive bond covenants7, especially 
those related to takeover defenses. The authors illustrate the idea first put forth in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) that corporate bond covenants reduce the cost of debt by protecting bondholders 
and mitigating potential conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. 
While restrictive covenants may protect bondholders, they are usually not involved in 
covenants’ determination ex ante, and unlike shareholders, cannot exert direct influence on 
management through traditional corporate governance vehicles (i.e., bondholders cannot vote).  As 
                                                     
7 For a discussion of restrictive covenants that we analyze, please refer to Appendix B 
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a matter of fact, the ability of bondholders to mitigate the agency problems ex post may be 
limited. Therefore, we investigate if governance influences the choice of debt covenants. 
Monitoring by regulators, banks, trade unions and blockholders is another broad 
governance channel, as well as supplementary monitoring through informed trading by 
shareholders, which compliments traditional corporate governance framework.8 Zhang and Zhou 
(2018) find that firms with greater institutional blockholding tend to use more covenants in their 
bond offerings, especially in presence of active or short-term blockholders. The authors suggest 
that covenants are employed ex ante to mitigate incentive conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders. Large informed shareholders can also “vote with their feet”. 9 For example, Admati 
and Pfleiderer (2009) show that large shareholders’ trading helps reduce agency costs and align 
managerial decisions with shareholders’ interests through the credible threat of exit on the basis of 
private information.  
There is evidence of prolific informed trading in bond markets, indicating the possibility 
of bondholders’ trading as a substitute for governance. Han and Zhou (2013) show that the impact 
of adverse selection due to information asymmetry in the corporate bond trading is higher in larger 
trade sizes, i.e. bond traders do not break orders to minimize price impact, unlike stock traders. 
This result is consistent with Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), who find that in bond markets 
dominated by institutional-sized trades (>$100,000) transaction costs decrease significantly with 
                                                     
8 Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that firms with weaker governance (fewer antitakeover provisions) exhibit more 
private information flow resulting in more informative stock prices through encouraging collection of and trading on 
private information (through higher level of institutional trading). Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) 
find that informed trading results in better incorporation of fundamentals into prices, which pressures management 
to select value enhancing projects. 
9 Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) show that even the threat of an informed block holder selling is sufficient to 
discipline management, reinforcing the importance of informed trading by large shareholders to the executives. 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks’s (2016) survey of institutional investors documents widespread behind-the-scenes 
intervention and governance-motivated exit as complementary mechanisms, with intervention occurring prior to 
potential exit.  
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trade size. Kedia and Zhou (2014) document the prevalence of informed trading in corporate bonds 
before takeover announcements, including the affinity of bond dealers affiliated with merger and 
acquisition advisors to sell bonds that accrue negative returns. 10 This mechanism is surprisingly 
similar to shareholders “voting with their feet”.  In this paper we also investigate if governance 
influences the amount of institutional trading (by sophisticated investors) in bonds.  
We expect that institutional trading serves as an alternative to strong bondholder protection 
(i.e. restrictive covenants). Hence we expect bonds that contain less restrictive covenants in their 
indentures to have relatively higher institutional trading volume, i.e. to exhibit signs of informed 
trading.  
Bond yields, ratings, and liquidity are related to corporate governance.11  Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) report that firms with stronger outside control of the board and greater 
institutional ownership (both indicating strong shareholder interest protection) enjoy lower bond 
yields and higher ratings on new bond issues due to lower default risk, information asymmetry 
between the firm and the lenders, agency costs, and better monitoring of managerial performance. 
However, they find that concentration of institutional ownership has an adverse effect on yields 
and ratings, the conclusion that has been further explored by Zhang and Zhou (2018), who 
postulate that blockholding aggravates bondholder concerns of agency conflict due to strengthened 
shareholder control. In order to mitigate this conflict, corporate bond issuers with more 
concentrated institutional shareholding use more covenants. 
                                                     
10 Wei and Zhou (2016) also find informed trading in bond markets prior to earnings announcements that contain 
earnings surprises, with the link most prominently displayed prior to negative news and in high-yield bonds. 
11 Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010) find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, better 
liquidity, and lower probability of informed trading in equity markets. 
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  Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) find, contrary to Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), that 
stronger shareholder rights protection increases the cost of debt financing. The results also suggest 
that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed 
favorably in the bond market, potentially due to alleviating the agency conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders.12 Supporting this conclusion, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) show 
that the impact of shareholder control on credit risk varies depending on the firm’s takeover 
vulnerability. In the presence of large institutional block holders, bond yields are higher if the firm 
is exposed to takeovers (i.e. exhibits weak managerial protection) and vice versa. But the authors 
also find that change of control risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong 
shareholder governance. These conclusions align with the agency costs model of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), which shows that stronger shareholder control (better alignment of management 
to shareholders) results in asset substitution concerns for bondholders, which potentially may be 
mitigated by strong debt covenants.  
Ashbaugh-Skaifea, Collins, and LaFond (2006) try to take a more comprehensive approach 
to corporate governance and investigate if firms with strong corporate governance benefit from 
higher credit ratings. They find that credit ratings are negatively related to the number of 
blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to weaker shareholder rights (associated with 
takeover defenses), as well as board independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. 
                                                     
12  Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982), Eger (1983), Dennis and McConnell (1986), and 
Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) all find insignificant excess returns to target bondholders. Walker (1994) 
finds that abnormal returns earned to nonconvertible bondholders after corporate takeovers are inversely related to 
issuer default risk. High quality bonds earn negative abnormal returns, and vice versa. Billett, King, and Mauer 
(2004) find that only non-investment grade target bonds earn positive announcement period returns, especially when 
the target's rating is below the acquirer's, due to the broadly documented co-insurance effect. 
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Overall, better governance translates into significant debt cost savings, due to the difference 
between investment and non-investment grade bond yields. 
King and Wen (2011) examine the effects of corporate governance on an integrated basis 
although from a different viewpoint, as consisting of shareholder governance in the form of 
antitakeover provisions and bondholder governance in debt covenants.13 While this approach may 
not be fully comprehensive, it attempts to investigate the combined effects of the governance 
structure onto the multi-sided agency conflict between bondholders, shareholders, and 
management. We proceed with the similar line of analysis by incorporating a comprehensive 
governance index representing strength the shareholders’ rights protection, board strength and 
independence, remuneration, audit and managerial entrenchment, as well as an index of debt 
covenants protecting the bondholders’ interests.  
Overall, the results of this paper contribute to the understanding of the effects of 
governance mechanisms on bondholders.  
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show the theoretical connection between corporate 
governance and restrictive covenants postulating that covenants reduce the cost of debt by 
                                                     
13 King and Wen (2011) find that strong bondholder protection results in more low-risk investments (capital 
expenditures) and diminishes high-risk investments (R&D expenditures), and weak shareholder governance 
(entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. They also show that financing and investment covenants 
exhibit especially strong binding power to deter risky investments that would disproportionately benefit the 
shareholders. 
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protecting bondholders and mitigating potential conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. 
Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) explicitly test this hypothesis and state that shareholder interests 
protected by the strong shareholder rights provisions diverge from bondholder interests without 
bond covenants. Corporate governance, however, is not defined by the shareholder rights 
protection alone. And while strong shareholder rights protection aggravates asset substitution 
concerns for bondholders, many other aspects of corporate governance framework aim to mitigate 
them. Using the governance portion of Bloomberg ESG (environmental, social, and governance) 
rank14 to account for the strength of the traditional internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as compensation, audit, board diversity and independence, managerial entrenchment and 
shareholder rights, allows us to test if high quality comprehensive corporate governance leads to a 
greater degree of financial flexibility, i.e. less restrictive covenants in the new bond issues. 
H1: Firms with high corporate governance rank issue bonds with less restrictive 
covenants. 
The governance portion of Bloomberg ESG index does not cover such important 
alternative or supplementary governance vehicles as monitoring by blockholders or informed 
trading in stock or bond markets. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) find that stocks with greater 
institutional ownership are priced more efficiently due to institutional trading activity. Bond 
market trading is dominated by institutions,15 and there exists ample evidence on informed trading 
in bond markets, which validates the investigation of corporate governance impact onto informed 
(institutional) trading in bond market.  
                                                     
14 For more information on Bloomberg ESG rating construction, please refer to Appendix A. 
15 Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) report that about 60% of all trades are in institutional-sized transactions 
(>$100,000) even after excluding the entire Rule 144A market, where trading is restricted to large institutions. 
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Furthermore, Kedia and Zhou (2014) find evidence of informed trading in bond markets in 
the course of mergers and acquisitions. They document, during the pre-announcement period, price 
run-up in target bonds that gain value and price decline in bonds that end up losing value. Wei and 
Zhou (2016) find informed trading in corporate bond markets around earnings announcements, 
especially evident in high-yield bonds during negative earnings surprises. Results are even stronger 
for institutional trades, tying informed trading to institutions yet again, and providing additional 
rationale for examining corporate governance influence on institutional bond trading. If 
institutional trading acts as an additional monitoring and disciplinary avenue in bond market due 
to poor corporate governance, then: 
H2: Firms with high corporate governance rank experience relatively less institutional 
trading in their bonds. 
Strong shareholder rights provisions may be detrimental to bondholders due to asset 
substitution concerns, resulting in higher bond yields in the presence of large and concentrated 
institutional stockholders. To alleviate these concerns credit risk reducing (restrictive) covenants 
may be introduced or institutional bondholders may participate in higher levels of informed 
trading. If restrictive covenants influence the proportion of institutional trading, then: 
H3: Bonds issued with more restrictive covenants experience less institutional trading. 
Corporate governance mechanisms influence not only information-based trading, but also 
market liquidity. For example, results in Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010) suggest that adopting 
governance standards that mitigate informational asymmetries may help alleviate informed trading 
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and improve stock market liquidity16. Liquidity is of utmost importance in the US bond markets, 
which warranties the investigation of impact of corporate governance and restrictive covenants.  
The importance of bond liquidity to firms’ outcomes is highlighted in the work of Whited 
(1992). She finds that problems of asymmetric information in debt markets affect financially 
unhealthy firms' ability to obtain outside financing and their investment expenditures over time. 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the firms, especially constrained and/or distressed firms, 
to ensure more bonds liquidity. Not only does bond liquidity reduce costs of further financing, but 
it also ensures a greater subscription to subsequent new issues. 
Only limited evidence of corporate governance impact on bond market liquidity exists.  
Lee and Cho (2016) suggest that corporate governance17 is a determinant of bond liquidity in 
Korean markets18, as it lowers transaction costs by improving transparency and reducing 
information asymmetry, but no such conclusion has been drawn about the fundamentally different 
US bond market (e.g. corporate bonds in Korea are mostly traded in the primary market 
transactions). One of the biggest drawbacks of this study is the sample period of 2003 to 2007, 
when the Korean bond market is still dominated by treasury and agency debt. 
H4: Firms with high corporate governance rank experience more active trading overall in 
the bond market. 
                                                     
16 They find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, higher market quality index, smaller 
price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading. 
17 Lee and Cho’s index of corporate governance quality includes information on the level of shareholders’ rights 
protection, functions of the board of directors, sufficiency of disclosure, presence of a responsible audit committee, 
and distribution of management loss. 
18 For more information on Korean bond markets, please refer to Korea Economic Institute whitepaper at 
http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_koreas_economy_choi.pdf  
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Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) show that strong management rights (strongest 
antitakeover provisions) lower the cost of debt financing by reducing the probability of extreme 
shareholder activism in the form of takeover, which is usually detrimental to bondholders. 
Furthermore, Cremer, Nair, and Wei (2007) show that shareholder and bondholder interests 
diverge unless binding and restrictive covenants are written into bond indentures. Risk covenants 
reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance, protecting bondholders. 
Therefore, restrictive covenants may produce additional benefits even in presence of strong 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
H5: Bonds issued with more restrictive covenants are traded more frequently.  
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) find that liquidity is priced in corporate bond yield spreads 
so that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads, and an improvement in liquidity causes a 
significant reduction in yield spreads. Hence, if strong corporate governance improves liquidity in 
the outstanding bonds, it decreases the costs of debt financing in the long run, and then: 
H6:  Firms with high corporate governance rank issue bonds that have lower yields at 
issuance. 
Previous studies show that firm size, leverage, debt maturity, and corporate liquidity and 
solvency concerns are important determinants of bond covenants (Malitz, 1986; Nash et al., 2003; 
Billett et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2014). Controlling for these factors, as well as the strength of 
corporate governance, if more restrictive covenants offer additional liquidity and yield benefits to 
the newly issued bonds, then:  
H7: Bonds issued with more restrictive covenants have lower yields at issuance. 
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Strong shareholder protection is detrimental to bondholders, but many other corporate 
governance avenues are favorable to them as well. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) provide evidence 
that stronger outside control of the board and greater (but not concentrated) institutional ownership 
lead to higher bond ratings and lower bond yields, mostly due to decreasing information 
asymmetry and mitigating agency costs, as well as monitoring of managerial efficiency. 
Ashbaugh-Skaifea, Collins, and LaFond (2006) confirm that firms with strong corporate 
governance (strong, independent and experienced boards) benefit from higher credit ratings.  
H8: Firms with high corporate governance rank issue bonds that have better credit ratings. 
If restrictive covenants act in compliment to strong corporate governance, then controlling 
for the corporate governance ranking: 
H9: Bonds issued with more restrictive covenants have better credit ratings at issuance. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
In this paper we use the governance portion of Bloomberg ESG (environmental, social, and 
governance) rating (further referred to as CG rank) to account for the strength of the traditional 
internal corporate governance mechanisms such as compensation, audit, board diversity and 
independence, shareholder rights and managerial entrenchment metrics. The index does not cover 
alternative or supplementary governance vehicles such as monitoring by blockholders or informed 
trading in stock market. Bloomberg evaluates companies annually collecting public governance 
data through companies’ websites, annual reports, as well as through direct contact. The rating 
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addresses such governance issues as board independence, diversity and undue busyness, 
remuneration, strength of audit, shareholder rights, and managerial entrenchment. 19 The 
governance portion of the Bloomberg ESG data covers 37 governance indicators including, but 
not limited to cumulative voting, executive compensation, unequal voting rights shares, takeover 
defenses, staggered boards, and independent directors within the seven aforementioned broader 
categories. Bloomberg ESG rating also penalizes companies for missing data, prizing the high 
level of public disclosure over opacity.  
We also construct a simple composite measure of covenant restrictiveness due to the 
categorical nature of the covenants presence or absence. We count the number of restrictive 
covenants imposed on the debt issue to obtain an ordinal composite variable. The data on restrictive 
covenants comes from Bloomberg.20 
The data on bond trading comes from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) 
distributed by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. We dismiss all non-corporate debt, 
debt of any foreign financial entities, as well as any debt in TRACE that Bloomberg does not 
collect data on.  
Issuer level quarterly and annual accounting data is from Compustat. 
The data sample only covers TRACE eligible US corporate bonds issued in 2014 through 
2017, and we collect various data on complexity features, restrictive covenants, and trading of 
about 16,000 bonds issued over this period of time by about 1,000 US publicly traded firms. 
                                                     
19 Refer to Appendix A for full details on factors covered by the governance portion of Bloomberg ESG rating, as 
well as its compilation. 
20 Refer to Appendix B for full list and generally accepted legal definitions an/or examples of covenants covered in 
Bloomberg database. 
 51 
 
We only examine the trading in newly issued bonds during the first calendar year post-
issuance, due to the fact that the trading activity in bonds thins out significantly only after the very 
first month post-issuance and by the twelfth month the turnover is negligible21. Most firms also 
consistently issue debt, and top bond (the bond with most trading during the day, as defined in 
Edward, Harris and Piwowar (2007)) is usually the newest in the company’s string of debt 
securities. For the analysis we also exclude rule 144A issuances, as they have been previously 
shown to be very different from issuances to the open market22. 
Table 2.1 presents sample descriptive statistics. Panel A describes an average firm in the 
sample, which, at $45.6 million in market capitalization is fairly large, and offers new bonds about 
12 times a year. The average leverage of the firm in the sample is just over 33% of total assets, 
with about 6% of total debt due next year. An average firm is solvent and liquid with an average 
current and quick ratio of 1.58 and 1.24 respectively, and with access to cash and short-term 
investments in the amount of 10.92% of its total assets. Most importantly, an average firm in the 
sample has a corporate governance rank of 75.6 (that rank is calculated per firm within an industry 
peers group). The information in panel B describes an average bond. Issued with maturity of about 
12.5 years, a coupon at issuance of about 2% and in the amount of right under $208 million, an 
average bond is non-convertible and non-callable, and is rated BBB. This average bond in the 
sample is very representative of the overall bond market new issues as described by various 
SIFMA reports.23 An average bond in the sample is issued with about 6 restrictive covenants, 
however the covenant data is not available for every issue that data was collected on. While the 
                                                     
21 See, for example, the report to the SEC Fixed Income Advisory Committee at 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fixed-income-advisory-committee/blackrock-next-generation-bond-market-fimsa-
011118.pdf  
22 Livingston, Zhou (2002); Zhu, Cai (2014) 
23 See, for example, US Corporate Bond Issuance Report at 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/archive/research/statistics/  
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manual check of many such issues provided that no restrictive covenants were written into bonds’ 
indentures, we do not include these bonds into final analysis. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary results are available in table 2.2 and presented in the univariate Pearson 
correlation matrix. The most important result in panel A is that company’s CG rank is inversely 
related to the average number of covenants on the firm’s newly issued bonds (Restrictive 
Covenants), indicating that restrictive covenants may be employed to tackle poor governance 
concerns of investors. Companies with higher CG rank are larger in size (Market Capitalization) 
and more likely pay dividends (Dividend Payer), have higher credit ratings (Credit Rating) and 
offer more debt (Annual Offering). Size is strongly related to other variables of interest in the same 
direction as the CG rank, which makes size effect extremely important in regression analysis, as 
has been shown in Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), and Cook, Fu, ad Tang (2014).  
Panel B shows that in a univariate setting, the increase in number of Restrictive Covenants 
of each individual bond is positively correlated with Yield at Issuance and negatively correlated 
with issue’s Credit Rating (positively correlated with Credit Watch), thus contradicting hypotheses 
7 and 9. On bond level Issuer CG Rank remains negatively correlated with Restrictive Covenants, 
and indicated better credit quality (positively correlated with Credit Rating, and negatively 
correlated with Credit Watch) and associated lower Yield at Issuance. 
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Hypothesis 1 is formally tested in table 2.3. We test whether firms with higher corporate 
governance rank issue bonds with less restrictive covenants: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑇𝐷 𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
To start off, we determine whether higher CG ranked firm issue more debt, as univariate 
results in tables 2.1 and 2.2 suggested. Regressions 1, 2, and 3 are firm-level regressions with one 
annual observation per firm, if the firm reported issuance in the given year and had at least some 
restrictive covenants data available. The variable of interest, Issuer CG Rank, remains statistically 
insignificant in influencing either of three debt volume determining dependent variables (Number 
of Bonds Issued, Average Offering Amount, and Total Offering Amount annually in regressions 1, 
2, and 3 respectively) in presence of firm-level controls and industry fixed effects, indicating that 
the size effect (Market Capitalization is positive) might be the driver behind the univariate results. 
Larger firms tend to have higher CG rank and better credit ratings. 
We then investigate if CG Rank influences restrictive covenants averaged at firm level 
(regression 4) and for individual bonds (regression 5). While both Average Restrictive Covenants 
(firm-level variable), and Individual Restrictive Covenants (bond level variable) are negatively 
related to Size (Market Capitalization) and Credit Rating determinants, there exists weaker 
evidence (coefficients significant at 10% level) of negative relation between good corporate 
governance and more restrictive covenants. In other words, the marginal effect perseveres even 
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conditional on all the important determinants of bond covenants as defined in Nash et al. (2003), 
Billett et al. (2007), and Cook et al. (2014), in support of hypothesis 1. 
Table 2.4 presents results of formally testing hypothesis 2 using the following regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽3𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +
𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖   + 𝛽7𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐿𝑇𝐷 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖+𝛽12𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
We average trading data for all of the bonds of a given firm daily to obtain 92,081 daily 
observations on institutional trading in bonds of each firm. Trading data on bonds is collected only 
over the first year after issuance, as bond trading thins out considerably even after the first month 
post issue. This conclusion predicates the strong negative relation between Average Days Since 
Issuance across all measures of institutional trading activity in regressions 1 through 4. Across all 
specifications companies with higher CG Rank have less institutional trading in their bonds (CG 
Rank coefficient is negative in regressions 1, 2, and 4 where the dependent variables are Number 
of Institutional Trades, % Institutional Trades, and % Institutional Trading Volume respectively), 
providing strong support for hypothesis 2. 
Turning to individual bond-day level data not aggregated at firm level, we test if bonds 
issued with more restrictive covenants experience less institutional trading controlling for issuing 
firm’s CG Rank, using the following regression: 
 55 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖  +  𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Table 2.5 presents the results of the regression above, and consistent with table 2.4 testing 
hypothesis 3, we use Number of Institutional Trades, % Institutional Trades, Institutional Trading 
Volume, and % Institutional Trading Volume as dependent variables in regressions 1 through 4 
respectively. In presence of Issuer CG Rank (negative and significant across all specifications) 
Restrictive Covenants provide additional reduction in Number of Institutional Trades and 
Institutional Trading Volume, but this reduction may be driven by the overall reduction in trading, 
as indicated by positive coefficients on Retail Number of Trades and Retail Trading Volume in 
regressions 1 and 3 respectively. With this in mind, using proportional measures of trading activity 
as dependent variables allows us to observe in regressions 2 and 4 that % Institutional Trades and 
% Institutional Trading Volume increase with increasing number of restrictive covenants.  
Bonds issued with restrictive covenants are traded less actively (by both institutions and 
retail investors), however, institutions participate relatively more actively in trading of bonds with 
restrictive covenants controlling for overall reduction in trading, which leads us to find no support 
for hypothesis 3. An additional result of interest is that across all specifications, institutional 
trading activity is greater for convertible bonds (positive coefficient on Convertible in all 
regressions 1 through 4), which comprise less than 0.5% of the sample bonds. 
To further explore trading activity in bonds issued with restrictive covenants, dependent 
on CG rank, table 2.6 presents results on testing hypotheses 4 and 5 using the following 
regressions: 
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Panel A: 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡   +
 𝛽4𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖   +
𝛽7𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑇𝐷 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖+𝛽12𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Panel B: 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽3𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖  +  𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Panel A uses daily aggregated at the firm level data on bond trading. Results in panel A 
indicates that while Average and Total Number of Trades increase, Average and Total Trading 
Volume do not change significantly in response to better CG Rank of the firm, consistent with 
findings in table 2.4 that institutions trade less in bonds of firms with better CG Rank.  Average 
and Total Number of Trades as well as Total Trading Volume (dependent variables in regressions 
1, 2, and 4 respectively) decline with increasing Credit Rating, while Average Trading Volume is 
not significantly related to Credit Rating, consistent with results in table 2.4, where Institutional 
Trading Volume in regression 3 increases with better credit rating, overpowering the negative 
relation between Credit Rating and trading activity variables present in regressions 1,2, and 4 of 
table 2.6. 
Panel B employs bond trading data aggregated daily per each bond. Bond market trading 
volume is driven by institutional traders, and therefore the results in panel B are closely related to 
results reported in table 2.5. The number of trades is not significantly related to either CG rank or 
individual bond’s Restrictive Covenants, as in the sample on average 50% of trades are retail-sized. 
Total Trading Volume declines in both CG rank and Restrictive Covenants consistent with all 
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regression specifications in table 2.5, due to institutional trading volume representing 90% of total 
trading volume of an average bond in the sample. 
Table 2.7 present the results of test for hypotheses 6 and 7 using the following regressions: 
(1): 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡   +
 𝛽4𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡   +
𝛽7𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑇𝐷 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽12𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
(2): 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖  +  𝛽4𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖  + 𝛽5𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖, + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Results in table 2.7 fail to support either hypotheses 6 or 7. CG Rank is insignificant at 
determining Average Yield at Issuance, and Restrictive Covenants variable is insignificant in 
presence of Issuer CG Rank and bond-level determinants of yield. Firm and Bond Credit Rating 
however are both significantly negatively related to the at-issuance yield (a step up in Firm Credit 
Rating produces a reduction of 0.25% in Average Yield at Issuance, and an incremental increase 
in Bond Credit Rating reduces the given bonds Yield at Issuance of 0.23%). Results in table 2.2 
indicate that Restrictive Covenants is strongly negatively correlated with Credit Rating. In this 
light, it is important to investigate if Restrictive Covenants become substantially more important 
at median credit rating (BBB) and at marginally investment grade credit rating (BBB-). 
Panel A of table 2.8 presents the difference-in-means analysis for the average number of 
restrictive covenants a firm issues their new bonds with, and the number of individual bond 
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restrictive covenants in a new issue, between firms (bonds) with credit rating equal to median BBB 
(including all BBB group ratings: BBB+, BBB, and BBB-) versus all other rating categories. Mean 
of the average number of restrictive covenants that that BBB rated firms issue their new debt with 
is 8.21 versus 7.43 for firm in any other category rated firm. The difference of about 0.77 extra 
restrictive covenants on average for a BBB rated firm is statistically significant. Bonds issued with 
BBB category rating are issued with about 0.85 extra restrictive covenants as well (6.97 versus 
6.12 for bonds within other ratings categories), and the difference is statistically significant. 
Panel B of table 2.8 presents the difference-in-means analysis for the average number of 
restrictive covenants a firm issues their new bonds with, and the number of restrictive covenants 
in a new bond between firms (bonds) with credit rating is equal to marginally investment grade 
rating of BBB- versus all other rating categories. Not all of the individual bond issuances are rated, 
which limits our number of observations for bond level difference-in-means comparison to 3,888 
bond issuances. The results in panel B indicate that for firms and bonds within the lowest 
investment grade BBB- rating category, the difference in the mean number of restrictive covenants 
is even more distinct. Firms rated BBB- on average issue bonds with 0.87 more restrictive 
covenants, and bonds issued with a marginally investment grade rating have on average 1.39 more 
restrictive covenants written into their indentures. This result indicated that restrictive covenants 
are extremely important for marginal credit ratings supporting hypotheses 8 and 9. 
The full results of testing hypotheses 8 and 9 are presented in table 2.9 in the form of the 
following regression: 
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡   +  𝛽4𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖, +
𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖   + 𝛽7𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 +
 59 
 
𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑇𝐷 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖+𝛽12𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Results presented in table 2.9 do not support hypotheses 8. In presence of firm-level proxies 
for firm size, solvency, profitability, operating working capital liquidity, leverage and return of 
cash to shareholders (regressions 1 and 2), as well as bond level quality proxies (regression 2), CG 
Rank is insignificant both on the firm and bond level, despite the strong positive correlation 
presented in table 2.2. All in all, effects of CG Rank on Credit Rating may be indirect, through a 
relation with other traditional determinants of Credit Rating. Regression 2 indicates that, 
contradictory to hypothesis 9, Restrictive Covenants variable is negatively related to bond Credit 
Rating. Bonds issued with more restrictive covenants tend to have lower credit ratings. This may 
mean that restrictive covenants are widely used to alleviate credit concern of the investor. 
Combining this conclusion with the result of difference-in-means analysis presented in table 2.8, 
we investigate the effect of Restrictive Covenants on the likelihood of a bond being BBB (including 
BBB+, BBB, and BBB- subcategories) or specifically BBB- rated, as well as the likelihood of bond 
placed on Credit Watch over the sample period, using the following regression:   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽1𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 +
𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖  +  𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Table 2.10 provides evidence of restrictive covenants use to grip to the lowest investment 
grade rating. The likelihood of being rated within one of the BBB rating categories increases with 
Issuer CG Rank, however when it comes to the marginally investment grade bonds, rated BBB-, 
Issuer CG Rank is rendered insignificant, however Restrictive Covenants increase increases the 
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likelihood of a bond holding on to the BBB- rating. Consistent with results in table 2.8, restrictive 
covenants are used as the last resort measure to issue cheaper and more widely traded debt by 
remaining within the investment grade range. Regression 3 provides an additional piece of 
evidence against hypothesis 8. Higher Issuer CG Rank increases the likelihood of Credit Watch, 
potentially due to exacerbated asset substitution concerns described in Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). At the same time, and also in line Jensen and Meckling (1976), regression 3 results show 
that increase in number of Restrictive Covenants decreases the likelihood of Credit Watch 
rendering additional support to hypothesis 9. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Restrictive covenants and high quality corporate governance are not perfect substitutes, but 
rather restrictive convents are supplemental. Using the governance portion of Bloomberg 
Environmental, Social, and Governance rating to account for the strength of the traditional internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and a simple composite measure of covenant restrictiveness,  
We establish that firms with high CG rank issue bonds with less restrictive covenants, but this 
relation is not always clear in bond market trading setting. 
While firms with high CG rank unequivocally experience less institutional trading in their 
bonds across all specifications, bonds issued with more restrictive covenants actually experience 
proportionally more institutional trading, when controlling for the overall trading activity.  
Neither corporate governance, nor restrictive covenants provide additional benefits of 
reducing at-issuance yields, which are strongly determined by the bond credit ratings. This renders 
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the analysis of corporate governance and restrictive covenants effects on credit ratings extremely 
important. 
Hypothesis 8 associated with the role of corporate governance in determining the quality 
of firm’s credit does not find support in our analysis, variable of interest, CG Rank, is insignificant 
across all specification used to test hypothesis 8. 
However, we conclude that restrictive covenants are likely introduced to alleviate asset 
substitution concerns described in Jensen and Meckling (1976), as firms that issue bonds with 
more restrictive covenants, are less likely to be put on credit watch, and more likely to keep 
investment grade credit rating, controlling for the quality of governance. Also, bonds issued with 
more restrictive covenants (controlling for issuing company governance rank) have lower credit 
ratings at issuance. 
We believe that the results of this paper contribute to better understanding of the effects of 
governance mechanisms on bondholders.  
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Table 2.1 
Sample statistics for firms in the sample and bonds issued by them 
The table presents average accounting, credit rating, and debt issuance metrics for firms in the sample, as well as 
average characteristics of the bonds issued by these firms.  
Panel A. Firms in sample  
Firm level (all firms) N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
CG Rank 1,116 75.60 76.58 6.53 
Average Number of Restrictive Covenants 747 7.78 8.00 2.34 
Market Capitalization ($, mln) 1,116 45,676.19 21,822.63 71,536.38 
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 1,116 33.21% 31.92% 18.69% 
Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio 1,116 48.55% 66.56% 20.03% 
Long-Term Debt Due in One Year (% Total Debt) 1,116 6.12% 4.04% 7.87% 
Cash and Short-Term Investments to Assets Ratio 1,116 10.92% 6.43% 12.66% 
Return on Assets 1,116 4.35% 4.23% 7.06% 
Current Ratio 1,116 1.57 1.34 1.01 
Quick Ratio 1,116 1.24 1.02 0.94 
Stock Repurchase (=1, if repurchase happens) 1,116 0.75 1 0.43 
Dividend Payer (=1, if dividend is payed) 1,116 0.87 1 0.33 
# Bonds Issued Per Year 1,116 11.86 1 98.33 
Annual Offering Amount ($, mln) 1,116 3,611.75 1,498.42 6,118.14 
Panel B. Bonds in sample  
Bond level (all non-144A issuances) N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Number of Restrictive Covenants 6,314 6.38 6.00 1.80 
Amount Issued ($, mln) 13,237 207.64 15.55 544.20 
Offering Price (% of par) 13,237 109.32 100 112.81 
Time to Maturity 13,237 12.50 4 13.03 
Callable 13,237 0.37 0 0.48 
Yield at issuance 8,419 1.99% 1.50% 2.37% 
Credit Rating (S&P) 3,888 BBB BBB 2.15 
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 Table 2.2 
Pearson correlation matrix 
The table presents correlations between various firm level and bond issuance level variables of interest. 
Panel A. Firms in sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. CG Rank 1           
(p-value)            
2. Restrictive Covenants  -0.163 1          
(p-value) (<.0001)           
3. Market Capitalization  0.150 -0.290 1         
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001)          
4. Debt-to-Assets Ratio -0.035 0.287 -0.078 1        
(p-value) (.255) (<.0001) (.009)         
5. Return on Assets -0.034 0.092 0.081 0.052 1       
(p-value) (.259) (.012) (.007) (.084)        
6. Current Ratio -0.008 0.131 -0.006 -0.094 0.936 1      
(p-value) (.813) (.012) (.863) (.005) (<.0001)       
7. Quick Ratio 0.024 0.084 0.039 -0.044 0.025 0.936 1     
(p-value) (.483) (.046) (.248) (.201) (.448) (<.0001)      
8. Stock Repurchase  0.035 -0.056 0.090 -0.131 0.117 0.079 0.072 1    
(p-value) (.254) (.127) (.003) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.019) (.033)     
9. Dividend Payer  0.129 -0.248 0.55 -0.093 0.003 -0.001 -0.022 0.029 1   
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.069) (.002) (.915) (.984) (.510) (.341)    
10. # Bonds Issued  0.055 -0.124 0.237 -0.008 -0.049 -0.074 -0.037 0.050 0.039 1  
(p-value) (.066) (.0007) (<.0001) (.786) (.105) (.028) (.285) (.096) (.191)   
11. Annual Offering  0.126 -0.238 0.636 -0.025 -0.045 0.065 0.122 0.061 0.058 0.039 1 
(p-value) (.0005) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.507) (.221) (.117) (.004) (.098) (.115) (.191)  
12. Credit Rating 0.179 -0.434 0.480 -0.375 0.191 0.031 0.051 0.176 0.290 0.023 0.173 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.459) (.230) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.528) (<.0001) 
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Table 2.2 – continued 
Panel B. Bonds in sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Issuer CG Rank 1         
(p-value)          
2. Restrictive Covenants  -0.193 1        
(p-value) (<.0001)         
3. Credit Rating 0.201 -0.353 1       
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001)        
4. Credit Watch -0.057 0.055 -0.006 1      
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.694)       
5. Amount Issued -0.138 0.155 0.111 0.153 1     
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)      
6.Yield at Issuance -0.163 0.211 -0.435 0.068 0.282 1    
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)     
7. Time to Maturity -0.035 -0.107 -0.129 0.050 0.116 0.126 1   
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)    
8. Offering Price 0.094 -0.006 -0.029 -0.017 -0.070 -0.002 0.080 1  
(p-value) (<.0001) (.663) (.088) (.056) (<.0001) (.853) (.089)   
9. Callable -0.111 0.138 -0.169 0.067 0.185 0.510 0.079 -0.010 1 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.276)  
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Table 2.3 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firm’s CG Rank on the number of bond issuances, mean and 
total dollar amount of debt offerings, as well as average number of restrictive covenants the firm 
chooses to issue its debt with. We also investigate the issuer CG Rank effect on individual bond 
restrictive covenants, controlling for firm-specific factors. T-statistics reported in parentheses are 
obtained from standard errors clustered by the industry (Bloomberg BICS level 1). ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Number of 
Bonds 
Issued 
Average 
Offering 
Amount 
Total 
Offering 
Amount 
Average 
Restrictive 
Covenants 
Individual 
Restrictive 
Covenants 
Issuer CG Rank -0.0931 -1.665 19.642 -0.0286* -0.547* 
 (-1.63) (-0.48) (0.59) (-1.79) (-1.92) 
Credit Rating 0.166 -21.842* -205.897* -0.268*** -0.376*** 
 (0.86) (-1.87) (-1.83) (-4.95) (-12.87) 
Market Capitalization 22.1*** 2.336*** 39.252*** -5.44*** -2.56*** 
 (4.76) (8.33) (14.53) (-4.20) (-5.01) 
Current Ratio -1.635 -66.964 -1145.41* 0.464 0.339* 
 (-1.52) (-1.03) (-1.83) (1.55) (1.73) 
Quick Ratio 2.665** 163.711** 2,258.03*** -0.419 -0.223 
 (2.04) (2.07) (2.97) (-1.15) (-1.02) 
Return on Assets -6.810 -230.73 -1,903.82 0.160 -0.114 
      
 (-1.37) (-0.77) (-0.66) (0.12) (-0.10) 
Cash and ST Investments  -7.560 -49.132 -5,264.97** -0.345 -1.085* 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(-1.83) (-0.20) (-2.18) (-0.30) (-1.85) 
LTD due Next Year  21.17*** -866.66*** 2,417.37 -1.849 -4.793*** 
 (3.96) (-2.68) (0.78) (-1.24) (-6.06) 
Stock Repurchase  -2.512*** -74.551 -513.611 0.291 0.907*** 
 (-2.80) (-1.38) (-0.98) (1.16) (6.43) 
Dividend Payer  2.130** -14.735 1,377.32** -0.0608 -0.604*** 
 (2.09) (-0.24) (2.32) (-0.21) (-3.39) 
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 2.186 66.347 -289.774 0.777 -0.524 
 (0.72) (0.36) (-0.16) (0.91) (-1.09) 
Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
1.421 215.162 1,042.21 -0.589 -0.219 
 (0.49) (1.24) (0.62) (-0.73) (-0.51) 
Callable     0.430*** 
     (3.48) 
Amount Issued     -0.038 
     (-0.44) 
Yield at Issuance     0.096* 
     (1.95) 
Industry FE YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
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Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 3,888 
adj. R2 0.178 0.351 0.507 0.340 0.423 
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Table 2.4 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firm’s CG Rank on the number and proportion of 
institutional trades and the total and proportional dollar volume of trades over $100,000 
(defined, following Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), as institutional). T-statistics 
reported in parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered by the industry 
(Bloomberg BICS level 1). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Number of 
Institutional 
Trades 
% 
Institutional 
Trades 
Institutional 
Trading 
Volume 
% Institutional 
Trading 
Volume 
CG Rank -0.0294*** -0.0029*** -0.020 -0.0011** 
 (-3.58) (-2.91) (-1.36) (-2.47) 
Number of Firms’ Bonds -0.0053 -0.0021 0.021 -0.0004 
Traded (-0.26) (-0.86) (1.03) (-0.53) 
Number of Trades 0.247*** -0.0102*** 0.265*** -0.0034*** 
 (8.26) (-9.92) (5.57) (-8.03) 
Average Days Since -0.0021*** -0.0001*** -0.0042*** -0.0001*** 
Issuance (-23.08) (-9.01) (-31.57) (-5.26) 
Credit Rating -0.0193 0.0045 0.199*** 0.002 
 (-0.67) (1.03) (3.89) (1.05) 
Market Capitalization 1.55 -0.179 0.202 -5.36 
 (1.35) (-1.13) (0.11) (-0.10) 
Current Ratio -0.478** -0.0133 -0.345 -0.008 
 (-2.85) (-0.59) (-1.40) (-1.05) 
Quick Ratio 0.616*** 0.0144 0.578* 0.0109 
 (3.19) (0.67) (1.80) (1.33) 
Return on Assets -0.108 0.0679 1.589 0.0444 
 (-0.10) (0.54) (0.91) (0.78) 
Cash and ST Investments  -0.782*** -0.133 -1.210* -0.0340 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(-3.40) (-1.42) (-1.86) (-1.60) 
LTD due Next Year  0.325 0.249** -0.775 0.0309 
 (0.73) (2.40) (-0.92) (1.42) 
Stock Repurchase  -0.149 -0.00786 -0.281 -0.0084 
 (-0.77) (-0.45) (-1.34) (-1.25) 
Dividend Payer  -0.275* 0.00625 0.173 -0.0118* 
 (-1.88) (0.29) (1.03) (-1.92) 
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 0.296 0.0974** 0.496 0.0203 
 (0.67) (2.35) (1.23) (1.32) 
Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
-0.312*** -0.0675** -1.067** -0.0255*** 
 (-3.26) (-2.35) (-2.54) (-3.38) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES 
N 92,081 92,081 92,081 92,081 
adj. R2 0.3815 0.377 0.245 0.149 
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Table 2.5 
We use OLS to examine the impact of individual bonds’ restrictive covenants on the daily 
number and proportion of institutional trades and the daily total and proportional dollar 
volume of institutional trades, controlling for issuing firms’ CG Rank, size, solvency, and 
leverage. T-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered by 
industry (Bloomberg BICS level 1), ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Number of 
Institutional 
Trades 
% 
Institutional 
Trades 
Institutional 
Trading 
Volume 
% 
Institutional 
Trading 
Volume 
Issuer CG Rank -0.0343*** -0.00307*** -0.039* -0.0015*** 
 (-2.75) (-3.24) (-1.87) (-4.62) 
Restrictive Covenants -0.102*** 0.007** -0.1566** 0.0019* 
 (-2.15) (1.97) (-2.63) (1.74) 
Credit Rating -0.195*** 0.0113** -0.0119 0.00521** 
 (-6.29) (2.22) (-0.28) (2.00) 
Callable 0.361** -0.0092 1.041*** 0.00614 
 (4.67) (-0.32) (7.98) (0.87) 
Convertible 1.906*** 0.198*** 3.2584*** 0.115*** 
 (7.22) (4.34) (7.09) (5.57) 
Days Since Issuance -0.002*** -0.0002*** -0.0045*** -0.0001*** 
 (-11.69) (-10.67) (-8.75) (-7.70) 
Retail Number of Trades 0.038*    
 (1.92)    
Retail Trading Volume   4.087***  
   (34.48)  
Issuer Market Capitalization 3.32*** -0.242** 2.972* -0.0447 
 (3.58) (-2.13) (2.80) (-1.26) 
Issuer Current Ratio -0.131 -0.0100 -0.0463 -0.00355 
 (-0.63) (-0.43) (-0.14) (-0.42) 
Issuer Return on Assets -1.264* 0.120 -0.452 0.0255 
 (-1.90) (1.01) (-0.44) (0.71) 
Issuer Cash and ST Investments 1.605*** -0.258*** 1.145*** -0.0554* 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(3.95) (-3.09) (2.59) (-1.74) 
Issuer LTD due Next Year  -2.343 0.282** -3.008 0.0638* 
 (-1.40) (2.00) (-1.62) (1.69) 
Stock Repurchase  0.234 -0.0391 -0.0654 -0.0111** 
 (0.71) (-1.40) (-0.14) (-2.27) 
Dividend Payer  -0.126 -0.000508 0.2407 -0.00789** 
 (-0.91) (-0.03) (0.73) (-2.36) 
Issuer Debt-to-Assets Ratio 0.678 0.131* 0.9181 0.0527*** 
 (0.71) (1.71) (0.75) (3.48) 
Issuer Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio 0.325 -0.0542* 0.0975 -0.0195** 
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 (0.71) (-1.65) (0.11) (-2.17) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES 
N 349,788 349,788 349,788 349,788 
adj. R2 0.206 0.194 0.358 0.053 
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Table 2.6 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firm’s CG Rank on the total and average number and 
dollar volume of trades of bonds of a firm, and the impact of individual bonds’ restrictive 
covenants on the daily number total dollar volume of trades, controlling for issuing firms’ CG 
Rank, size, solvency, and leverage. T-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from 
standard errors clustered by industry (Bloomberg BICS level 1), ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
Panel A. Daily Firm Observations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Average 
Number of 
Trades 
Total Number 
of Trades 
Average  
Trading 
Volume 
Total Trading 
Volume 
CG Rank 0.0562** 0.674*** 0.0033 0.140 
 (2.00) (2.87) (0.29) (1.45) 
Number of Firms’ Bonds 0.120* 8.546*** 0.0428*** 3.434*** 
Traded (1.80) (3.89) (4.31) (4.74) 
Average Days Since -0.0000551 -0.00342 -0.0037*** -0.0167*** 
Issuance (-0.06) (-0.77) (-9.81) (-6.97) 
Credit Rating -0.633*** -4.552*** -0.066 -0.962** 
 (-4.45) (-3.41) (-1.42) (-1.99) 
Market Capitalization 12.8* 19.2*** 5.185*** 81.99*** 
 (1.86) (3.83) (3.77) (6.83) 
Current Ratio 1.005 2.038 0.126 0.021 
 (1.21) (0.76) (0.52) (0.01) 
Quick Ratio -1.921 -0.854 -0.213 0.815 
 (-1.47) (-0.18) (-0.64) (0.40) 
Return on Assets -5.439 -3.413 0.151 5.706 
 (-1.24) (-0.13) (0.12) (0.43) 
Cash and ST Investments  6.357 -7.631 1.077 -3.038 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(1.16) (-0.23) (0.59) (-0.21) 
LTD due Next Year  -10.33** -26.89 -3.248* -17.446 
 (-2.40) (-0.75) (-1.88) (-1.31) 
Stock Repurchase  0.886 10.31* -0.047 2.124 
 (1.23) (1.68) (-0.19) (0.90) 
Dividend Payer  0.933 8.762 0.071 4.097 
 (1.01) (1.27) (0.31) (1.36) 
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 0.126 -4.520 0.599 4.529 
 (0.08) (-0.29) (1.13) (0.66) 
Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio 0.168 -3.644 -0.664 -5.643 
 (0.17) (-0.37) (-1.40) (-0.95) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES 
N 103,874 103,874 103,874 103,874 
adj. R2 0.095 0.595 0.067 0.4217 
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Table 2.6 – continued 
 Panel B. Daily Bond Observations 
 (1) (2) 
 
Total 
Number of 
Trades 
Total 
Trading 
Volume 
Issuer CG Rank 0.00686 -0.02* 
 (0.21) (-1.92) 
Restrictive Covenants -0.387 -0.152** 
 (-1.46) (-2.14) 
Yield at Issuance -0.248 0.521*** 
 (-0.67) (16.70) 
Credit Rating -0.764*** 0.04 
 (-4.75) (0.84) 
Callable 1.527*** 0.419** 
 (5.43) (2.53) 
Convertible -2.930*** 4.495*** 
 (-2.60) (11.17) 
Days Since Issuance 0.000335 -0.004*** 
 (0.66) (-8.68) 
Issuer Market Capitalization 9.63** 3.018*** 
 (2.07) (2.74) 
Issuer Current Ratio 0.282 0.02 
 (0.36) (0.06) 
Issuer Quick Ratio -0.758 0.092 
 (-0.84) (0.21) 
Issuer Return on Assets -7.432** -0.687 
 (-1.98) (-0.95) 
Issuer Cash and ST Investments 7.301*** 1.508*** 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(2.99) (3.17) 
Issuer LTD due Next Year  -12.19* -3.861*** 
 (-1.85) (-2.60) 
Stock Repurchase  1.302 0.259 
 (1.53) (0.74) 
Dividend Payer  -0.276 0.255 
 (-0.46) (0.95) 
Issuer Debt-to-Assets Ratio -1.459 1.239 
 (-0.74) (1.17) 
Issuer Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
1.845 -0.098 
 (0.99) (-0.13) 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES 
N 478,587 478,587 
adj. R2 0.039 0.063 
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Table 2.7 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firm’s CG Rank average yields of its newly issued 
bonds, and the impact of individual bonds’ restrictive covenants on at-issuance yield, 
controlling for issuing firms’ CG Rank, size, solvency, and leverage. T-statistics reported in 
parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered by industry (Bloomberg BICS level 
1), ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1)  (2) 
 
Average 
Yield at 
Issuance  
Yield at 
Issuance 
CG Rank 0.0116 Issuer CG Rank 0.0118 
 (0.91)  (1.35) 
Average Restrictive 
Covenants 
 Restrictive Covenants 0.0178 
Covenants   (0.67) 
Firm Credit Rating -0.247*** Bond Credit Rating -0.232*** 
 (-8.38)  (-7.30) 
Average Issue Volume 0.0002** Issue Volume 0.226*** 
 (2.19)  (5.89) 
Average Offering Price 0.00534*** Offering Price 0.100 
 (12.38)  (1.58) 
Average Time to Maturity 0.0067** Time to Maturity 0.0681*** 
 (2.16)  (12.90) 
  Callable 0.393*** 
   (4.30) 
  Convertible -2.218*** 
   (-5.53) 
Market Capitalization 0.273 Issuer Market Capitalization 0.214 
 (0.41) 
 (0.49) 
Current Ratio 0.271* Issuer Current Ratio -0.155 
 (1.72)  (-0.92) 
Quick Ratio -0.191 Issuer Quick Ratio 0.127 
 (-1.45)  (0.71) 
Return on Assets -1.576*** Issuer Return on Assets -1.327** 
 (-3.70)  (-1.97) 
Cash and ST Investments  -0.00792 Issuer Cash and ST 
Investments 
-0.0661 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(-0.01) to A sets Ratio 
 
(-0.33) 
LTD due Next Year  -0.0228 Issuer LTD due Next Year  -0.467 
 (-0.04)  (-0.87) 
Stock Repurchase  0.173 Stock Repurchase  0.179** 
 (1.13)  (2.55) 
Dividend Payer  -0.106 Dividend Payer  -0.321** 
 (-1.05)  (-2.06) 
Debt-to-Assets Ratio -0.0388 Issuer Debt-to-Assets Ratio -0.157 
 (-0.08)  (-0.54) 
Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio 0.586 Issuer Liabilities-to- Assets 0.386 
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Ratio (1.22) Ratio (1.60) 
Industry FE YES Industry, Year FE YES 
Clustered SE YES Clustered SE YES 
N 1,116 N 3,338 
adj. R2 0.429 adj. R2 0.655 
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Table 2.8 
We use difference-in-means analysis to examine the impact of firm and bond credit ratings on 
firm average and individual bonds number of restrictive covenants. T-statistics reported in 
parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered by industry (Bloomberg BICS level 
1), ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
Panel A     
 N Average Restrictive 
Covenants 
N Restrictive 
Covenants 
BBB 512 8.21 1,171 6.97 
All Other Ratings 604 7.44 2,717 6.12 
Difference-in-Means 1,116 0.77*** 3,888 0.85*** 
  (4.5)  (17.5) 
Standard Deviation  2.31  1.76 
     
Panel B     
 N Average Restrictive 
Covenants 
N Restrictive 
Covenants 
BBB- 106 8.58 1,689 7.71 
All Other Ratings 1,010 7.71 3,719 6.32 
Difference-in-Means 1,116 0.87*** 3,888 1.39*** 
  (2.78)  (12.7) 
Standard Deviation  2.33  1.78 
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Table 2.9 
We use OLS to examine the impact of firm’s CG Rank on its average bond credit rating, as 
well as the impact of individual bonds’ restrictive covenants on their credit ratings, 
controlling for issuing firms’ CG Rank, size, solvency, and leverage. T-statistics reported in 
parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered by industry (Bloomberg BICS level 
1), ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 Average Credit Rating Bond Credit Rating 
CG Rank 0.0197 0.0084 
  (1.44) (0.48) 
Restrictive Covenants  -0.245*** 
  (-5.61) 
Average Issue Volume -0.99 0.993 
 (-1.35) (0.06) 
Average Time to Maturity 0.002 0.016*** 
 (0.61) (3.22) 
Offering Price  -0.310*** 
  (-3.37) 
Callable  -0.368*** 
  (-3.39) 
Convertible  -2.041*** 
  (-3.1) 
Market Capitalization 1.478*** 0.812*** 
 (4.44) (5.93) 
Current Ratio -0.519 -0.537 
 (-1.0) (-0.88) 
Return on Assets 6.508*** 5.815*** 
 (2.60) (3.50) 
Cash and ST Investments  1.507 3.068* 
to Assets Ratio 
 
(1.49) (1.89) 
LTD due Next Year  3.434*** 4.346* 
 (2.81) (3.09) 
Stock Repurchase  0.818*** 1.119*** 
 (2.79) (4.49) 
Dividend Payer  0.953*** 1.175*** 
 (4.62) (4.54) 
Debt-to-Assets Ratio -5.464*** -3.205*** 
 (-5.39) (-3.76) 
Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio 1.397 0.312 
 (1.30) (0.42) 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES 
N 1,116 3,888 
adj. R2 0.693 0.633 
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Table 2.10 
We use probit to examine the impact of issuing firm’s CG Rank and bond’s restrictive covenants 
on likelihood of bonds being rated in median BBB broad category (including BBB+, BBB, and 
BBB- subcategories), marginal investment grade BBB- category, and likelihood of being placed 
on credit watch during the sample period, controlling for issuing firms’ CG Rank, size, solvency, 
and leverage. T-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from standard errors clustered by 
industry (Bloomberg BICS level 1), ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BBB BBB- Credit Watch 
Issuer CG Rank 0.0246** -0.0061 0.0575*** 
 (2.02) (0.13) (3.24) 
Restrictive Covenants 0.0686** 0.1404*** -0.0823*** 
 (2.29) (-8.94) (-2.76) 
Issue Volume -7.94 -3.04 16.7 
 (-0.44) (-0.18) (1.24) 
Time to Maturity 0.0013** 0.0014** -0.00472 
 (2.46) (2.18) (-0.59) 
Offering Price  -0.00258** -0.0019** -0.0008 
 (-2.37) (-2.05) (-0.11) 
Callable -1.1598*** -0.0427 -0.0663 
 (-3.24) (-0.32) (-0.41) 
Issuer Market Capitalization -9.40*** -2.42** -2.36*** 
 (-3.65) (-2.69) (-3.08) 
Issuer Current Ratio -0.319 -0.273 -0.172 
 (-0.65) (-0.58) (-0.69) 
Issuer Quick Ratio 0.415 0.193 -0.537 
 (0.77) (0.34) (-1.70) 
Issuer Return on Assets 1.236 -3.192* 2.043 
 (0.54) (-1.78) (1.23) 
Issuer Cash and ST 
Investments 
-1.170** 0.0405 -0.588 
to A sets Ratio 
 
(-2.67) (0.02) (-0.49) 
Issuer LTD due Next Year  0.553 -2.417** -2.813** 
 (0.41) (-2.55) (-2.25) 
Stock Repurchase  -0.772*** 0.122 0.0511 
 (-3.57) (0.41) (0.28) 
Dividend Payer  0.202 -0.307* -0.466** 
 (0.46) (-1.84) (-2.32) 
Issuer Debt-to-Assets Ratio -0.363 2.961** 0.930 
 (-0.41) (2.09) (1.33) 
Issuer Liabilities-to-Assets -0.0716 -2.808** -2.409*** 
Ratio (-0.09) (-2.14) (-3.40) 
N 3,888 3,888 3,888 
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.268 0.169 
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      PART 3 
BOND MARKET REACTION TO CREDIT RATINGS CHANGES, CREDIT WATCH 
IN POST- FINANCIAL CRISIS, POST CRA REGULATORY OVERHAUL 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We investigate bond market reactions in response to credit ratings changes in post-crisis 
and post- Dodd-Frank environment. The onset of the 2008 financial crisis, commonly time-
stamped as September, 200824 creates the cutoff for our pre-crisis sample period. While the official 
end date of the 2008 financial crisis is not quite as clear, because the “Great Recession” 
immediately followed and continued into 2012, we set the end of calendar year 2008 as our crisis 
cutoff date. The regulatory change, which we use to split our sample into pre- and post- regulatory 
environment change in CRA industry, is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (further referred to as Dodd-Frank or DF), effective July 21, 2010. We collect an 
additional data sample after recession end to verify the robustness of our results.25The recession 
period includes our post-crisis, pre- regulatory change, and post- regulatory change samples.  
Credit ratings are important to firms, investors and regulatory agencies as ratings provide
                                                     
24 The 2008 financial crisis was precipitated by rising residential mortgage delinquency rates starting in August 
2006, “housing bubble” burst, followed by Subprime Mortgage Crisis, with delinquency rate remaining on the rise 
throughout the 2008 financial crisis, peaking in the first quarter of 2010, but extending past 2008-2012 “Great 
Recession”. Further information is available from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRSFRMACBS  
25 Please, refer to Figure 1 for a visual representation of the sample timeline 
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certification for borrowers and “coordinate” investors’ beliefs. In recent years, the failure of the 
CRAs to adequately evaluate risk in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis has emphasized the 
paramount importance of credit ratings to the economy and has led to increased regulatory 
oversight. For example, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to issue an annual examination report on credit agencies.26 The recent 2016 
examination report demonstrates increased compliance as nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations (NRSROs) respond to the comprehensive credit rating reforms adopted by the 
SEC.27 The SEC report concludes that credit ratings in the post-crisis era are more accurate.  
Contrary to SEC findings, research suggests that CRAs effectiveness has, in fact, declined 
post-crisis. For example, using the entry of Fitch Ratings in the CRA market as a structural break, 
Becker and Milbourn (2011) discover that upon entrance of Fitch into the CRA industry, S&P and 
Moody’s provide lower quality ratings, and that the ability of ratings to predict default has 
deteriorated. They conclude that the reputational mechanism underlying the provision of quality 
ratings is impaired.28 Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) find that CRAs became more 
conservative from 1985 to 2009. This increased ratings conservatism caused firms to issue less 
debt, reduce leverage, and hold more cash, which results in lower growth. Additional empirical 
evidence indicates that CRAs became even more protective of their reputation following the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.  
Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang (2015) find that following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
CRAs issue lower ratings, give more false warnings, and issue less informative downgrades. Given 
                                                     
26 There exists an additional SEC annual report mandated by the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. 
27 “…NRSROs are redoubling their focus on policy and procedure adherence to achieve enhanced transparency, 
quality, and integrity,”– Thomas J. Butler, Director of the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings. 
28 Future economic rents motivate current (unobserved) quality of ratings. If increasing competition from Fitch 
reduced expected future rents for the incumbents, the incentives for quality provision were consequently reduced. 
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this structural break in CRA activity that came with increased regulatory oversight in the post 
financial crisis. The reexamination of traditional conclusions about rating changes is warranted. 
As credit downgrades during a meltdown are anticipated, and CRAs conservatism increases, it is 
reasonable to assume that downgrades in the bond markets are no longer informative.  
Regulatory environment change acts as an additional natural experiment to measure 
differences in market reactions to credit changes, because during the 2008 financial crisis, in a 
noisy informational environment, individual downgrade announcements may be less informative 
due to the overall financial system instability. With increased CRAs transparency under regulatory 
oversight, and increased rating conservatism documented in the literature, more downgrades 
should be anticipated by the market and therefore considered less informative. This provides 
motivation for reexamining bond market reactions to changes in credit ratings in a post- regulatory 
change environment. We argue that changes in CRA industry result in muted bond market 
reactions to credit downgrades. 
On the other hand, prior research provides additional evidence of CRA ratings relevance 
in the crisis environment. Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang (2011) document that the 
relevance of managerial forecasts to credit markets is particularly strong during periods of high 
uncertainty, especially for firms with poor credit ratings or those announcing bad news. This 
suggest that institutional investors condition their investment decisions on the ratings more so 
during the financial crisis. Driss, Massoud, and Roberts (2016) also show that credit agencies and 
ratings remain relevant post crisis by providing certification for corporate borrowers through the 
credit watch procedure. Firms with confirmed ratings invest more capital and experience an 
increase in long-term debt financing. While we postulate that credit downgrades and credit watches 
become less informative, these results can lead to rejection hypotheses put forth in this analysis.  
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 The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate if investors react less intensively 
to downward credit updates post-crisis due to lesser informativeness of ratings or due to anticipated 
future credit upgrades, and if market reactions to credit watches are muted after the 2008 financial 
crisis. We also investigate if increased conservatism due to regulatory oversight in CRAs results 
in lesser informativeness of ratings for bond market investors, causing lighter reactions to credit 
downgrades and credit watch indications after the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. As downgrades during 
credit meltdowns are anticipated, and CRAs conservatism increases during credit meltdowns, it is 
reasonable to assume insignificant bond market reactions to downgrades and credit watches during 
and after a crisis. 
 
Hypotheses development 
 
Traditionally, CRAs are considered sophisticated processers of information and their 
ratings deliver valuable information to the market. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) study 
the price impact of firms being added to S&P’s “Credit Watch List” and document virtually no 
bond or stock price impact to downgrades or upgrades preceded by a credit watch, showing that 
changes in credit quality are anticipated by the market. However, when they further partition the 
credit watch additions into “expected” or “unexpected”, both bond and stock prices react 
negatively to an indicated downgrade in the “unexpected” subsample.  
Goh and Ederington (1993) also argue that a negative reaction should not be expected for 
all downgrades, as some are related to equity value increasing announcements (such as additional 
debt issuance). They examine the reaction of common stock returns to bond rating changes and 
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find that only downgrades conveying new information about deteriorating financial prospects 
evoke negative price reaction. Additionally, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find negative abnormal 
returns in the year following downgrades. These negative returns are further exacerbated at 
subsequent earnings announcements, which confirm negative information conveyed by the initial 
downgrade. Hence, unexpected credit downgrades or those conveying new negative information 
to the markets tend to bring significant price reactions.  
Interestingly, Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang (2015) show that, after the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, CRAs give more false warnings, issue downgrades that are less informative, and give 
lower ratings overall. They attribute these changes to the fact that only excessive optimism is 
penalized, due to the important role that highly rated investment grade securities play in insurance 
and banking industries. They conclude that the Dodd-Frank Act does not discipline CRAs to 
provide more accurate and informative credit ratings. As downgrades during the credit meltdown 
are anticipated, and CRAs conservatism increases, it is reasonable to assume insignificant price 
reactions to downgrades in the bond markets during and after a crisis. 
Hypothesis 1: If post-crisis credit downgrades are either less informative and/or expected, 
less intensive market reaction to downgrades will be observed in the bond market compared to 
pre-crisis period. 
Hypothesis 1a: If post- regulatory changes credit downgrades are either less informative 
and/or expected, less intensive market reaction to downgrades will be observed in the bond market 
compared to pre-regulatory changes period. 
The credit watch procedure may ease the conflict between rating stability and timely 
accuracy required from CRAs, allowing CRAs to postpone actual rating decision, while still 
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providing cautionary information to investors. When changes in rating are triggered, agencies 
adjust their ratings only partially, due to serial dependency of agency-rating migrations, potentially 
explaining historically observed rating conservatism.  
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) provide a rationale for credit ratings as a “focal 
point” for firms and their investors by providing a coordinating mechanism for investors’ beliefs. 
Credit ratings play an economically meaningful role due to their monitoring function (credit watch 
procedure) and their information certification role in delivering accurate and timely information 
for institutional investors’ decisions. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits’s model provides several 
empirical predictions regarding expected price impacts of rating changes. They postulate a firm 
put on credit watch should experience a large negative price change if the credit watch results in a 
downgrade, but only a moderate negative change, followed by a moderate positive change, if the 
credit watch is resolved in successful recovery.  
Bannier and Hirsch (2010) empirically extend some of the implications of Boot, Milbourn, 
and Schmeits (2006). They find that CRAs and lower rated firms develop an “implicit contract” 
forcing such firms to refrain from increasing their riskiness. Intensive monitoring and threat of 
downgrade throughout the watch procedure allow CRAs to influence low-rated firms’ risk choices. 
On the other hand, companies with high creditworthiness enjoy improved delivery of information 
through credit watch procedures. Watch listing is a CRAs’ response to investors’ need for accurate 
and stable rating information, which fulfils the CRA’s information-certification role. Overall, after 
the review procedure was introduced by Moody’s in 1991, direct rating downgrades lead to 
stronger market reactions than in prior periods. Since Bannier and Hirsch’s sample ends in 2004 
there is no test of how the financial crisis impacted the efficiency of CRAs’ downgrade watch. 
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Hypothesis 2: If the credit watch procedure is less informative post-crisis, firms placed on 
a credit watch list will experience less intensive market reaction to the credit watch initiation and 
subsequent credit rating downgrades.  
Hypothesis 2a: If the credit watch procedure is less informative post- regulatory changes, 
firms placed on a credit watch list will experience less intensive market reaction to a credit watch 
initiation and subsequent credit rating downgrades.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
In this paper, we use bond trading data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine) distributed by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. We exclude all non-corporate 
debt, debt of any foreign financial entities, as well as any debt in TRACE on which Bloomberg 
does not collect data. We also exclude rule 144A issuances from the analysis, as they have been 
previously shown to be different from issuances to the open market29. 
Credit ratings and credit watch data is hand-collected from Bloomberg, along with 
associated event dates. We collect about 160 credit change events, as well as 46 credit watch 
placements of S&P500 firms. We then encode the credit rating events to be represented by dummy 
variables depending on type of the credit event, for 30 days following the announcement. 
                                                     
29 Livingston and Zhou (2002); Zhu and Cai (2014) 
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 Firm level quarterly accounting data is collected from Compustat to control for individual 
size, leverage, profitability, liquidity and solvency, which influence both firm-related credit rating 
events and bond market activity. 
The data spans January 2007 to July 2016 (we omit the period of July, 2011 to January 
2015), in an attempt to access the dynamic change in bond market investors’ reactions to credit 
ratings events30. The onset of the 2008 financial crisis is commonly time-stamped September, 
2008. (federal government takeover of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, followed a week later by 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filings),31 creates the cutoff for our Pre-Crisis sample period. While 
the official end date of the 2008 financial crisis is not quite as clear cut, because of the “Great 
Recession” that immediately followed and continued into 2012, we accept the end of calendar year 
2008 as crisis cutoff date. The recession period includes our Post-Crisis, Pre- Dodd-Frank, and 
Post- Dodd-Frank subsamples.  
The main regulatory change, which we use to split our sample into pre- and post- regulatory 
environment change in CRA industry, is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, effective July 21, 2010. We collect additional data after the end of the recession 
for a robustness analysis on an additional post-crisis, post- regulatory change sample of bond trades 
and issuances in 2015 and first two quarters of 2016 to create event 6 quarter time intervals for all 
our sample periods except “Crisis”. 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics on average bond trading activity, bond yields and 
                                                     
30 Please, refer to Figure 1 for a visual representation of the sample timeline 
31 The 2008 financial crisis was precipitated by the rising residential mortgages delinquency rate starting in August 
2006, “housing bubble” burst, followed by Subprime Mortgage Crisis, with delinquency rate remaining on the rise 
throughout the 2008 financial crisis, peaking in the first quarter of 2010, but extending past 2008-2012 “Great 
Recession”. Further information is available from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRSFRMACBS  
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bond prices for firms in the sample and during Pre-Crisis, Crisis, Post-Crisis and Pre- Dodd-Frank, 
Post-Crisis and Post- Dodd-Frank, as well as Robustness sub-samples. Total Daily Volume is at 
the lowest in the earliest and latest parts of the sample, 57.49 million in Pre-Crisis and 62.06 
million in the Robustness subsample, while Average Daily Volume (averaged across all bonds of 
the firm before calculating the mean) and Average Daily Volume Per Bond (averaged across 
individual bonds of the firm before calculating the mean) has remained fairly stable over time at 
about 2.5 million and approximately 0.4 million respectively. All trading activity variables peak 
in Post-Crisis and Pre-Dodd-Frank subsamples, which correspond to the period between January 
2009 and July 2010 following the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of February 17, 2009. 
Next, conduct a univariate difference-in-means analysis, multivariate fixed and random 
effects regressions, and marginal effects regressions using standard methodology. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary results are available in table 3.2, which present univariate differences-in-
means of bond trading activity between subsamples. We calculate means of average bond trading 
activity variables, bond yields and bond prices across the firms in the sample and compare each 
against the full sample. The results of our comparison indicate that each subsample is 
systematically different from the rest. Panel A shows the comparison of the Pre-Crisis period to 
the rest of the sample. It confirms the observation from table 3.1 with a high degree of statistical 
significance, Total Daily Volume is lower by 7.84 million in the pre-crisis part of the sample. The 
majority of the trading activity variables are lower in the Pre-Crisis subsample, which is 
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representative of a strong time trend in the bond trading activity data. 
Panel B describes the crisis sample, and consequently provides the biggest difference in 
Average Credit Rating over all samples recorded of two full levels down from an average BBB to 
just above BB+ cutoff. Results in panels C, D, and E cover Post-Crisis & Pre- Regulatory Change, 
Post-Crisis & Post- Regulatory Change, Robustness subsamples respectively, and continue to 
support the univariate results in table 3.1. The Total Number of Trades peaks in the crisis and 
immediately following and then decline, however the effects of this trading activity are unequal 
between the two subsamples. In panel B (Crisis) the trades take place at a lower Average Price % 
Par the rest of the sample (13.51% of par less), indicating capital losses for investors if they sell 
their bond holdings during the credit meltdown. In panel C, during Post-Crisis & Pre- Regulatory 
Change time period, which includes inter alia the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and 
the large stimulus package associated with it, the losses decline (Average Price % Par lower by 
3.08) and turn into gains in Post Dodd-Frank era in panel D (Average Price % Par higher than the 
rest of the sample by 3.31). 
Panel A of table 3.3 presents the general results on changes in trading activity of bond 
investors, and trade yields and bond prices of firms affected by the credit rating events, and is 
presented as the following regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛  +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In Panel A, variable of interest Credit Downgrade is positive in specifications (1), (2), and 
(4) indicating increases in Total Daily Volume, Average Daily Volume, and Total Number of 
Trades in the 30 days following the downgrade. Credit Downgrade is negative in specification (8), 
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additionally signifying that investors accrue capital losses of about 1.601% of par (or $16.01 
dollars per bond for a normal $1,000 par security) due to increasing credit risk, and potential for 
new debt offerings from the firm with higher at-issuance yields. While Credit Upgrade is not a 
variable of interest in our analysis, upgrades do not produce significant price reactions, but 
generally increase trading activity (specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4)). 
Panel B of table 3.3 presents additional regression results on changes in the trading activity 
level of bond investors in response to the credit rating events conditional on a preceding credit 
watch, and is presented as the following regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡|𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ +
𝛽3𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡|𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛  + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In Panel B, the interaction term Credit Downgrade after CW remains insignificant across 
all specifications, indicating that the downgrade following the credit watch is less unexpected, as 
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) show. 
 The level of significance on the variable of interest Credit Downgrade declines across all 
specifications in presence of the interaction term, as compared to non-conditional results in panel 
A, while the magnitude of the coefficient increases across all specifications with statistically 
significant Credit Downgrade coefficients ((1), (2), and (4)). These results indicate that while the 
downgrade following the credit watch is less unexpected, the additional attention concentrated on 
the firm under the watch causes greater investor trading activity. 
Coefficients on sample sub period indicators Pre-Crisis and Crisis reaffirm the univariate 
difference-in-means results in table 3.2 that the trading activity is lower at the earlier part of the 
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sample. No additional inferences refuting or supporting hypotheses 1a and 1b can be made without 
further analysis. 
Table 3.4 presents the main results of testing hypothesis 1 using the following marginal 
effects regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡|𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛 +
𝛽3𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡|𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛  + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
While not all marginal effects were tested due to the lack of nonzero conditional 
observations Downgrade in Crisis and Downgrade Post-Crisis & Post DF are negative in 
specifications (1) and (2), and Downgrade in Crisis is negative in specifications (3), (4), and (5), 
indicating significant declines in trading activity on credit downgrades in those periods. These 
results provide some evidence to refute hypotheses 1a and 1b, as downgrades in post-crisis and 
post Dodd-Frank environment produce large reductions in daily trading volume ($32.96 million in 
total (1), or $2.989 million on average (2)) as compared to the robustness sub period. We fail to 
directly test hypothesis 1a due to the lack of nonzero conditional observations in Post-Crisis & Pre 
Dodd-Frank sub period sample, however the coefficient on No Change Rating Update Post-Crisis 
& Pre-DF (rating updates without changes are usually due to a completion of credit watch without 
a rating change or due to reaffirming of a stale rating) is significant in specifications (2). (3), (4), 
(5), and (8), reaffirming the inconclusive results of testing hypothesis 1a. Coefficients on Upgrade 
Post-Crisis & Post DF and No Change Rating Update Post-Crisis & Post-DF are not significant 
in all 9 regression specifications providing additional support to hypothesis 1b. 
Table 3.5 presents the general results on changes in trading activity of bond investors, and 
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trade yields and bond prices of the affected firms in response to a credit watch initiation, and is 
presented as the following regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑊𝑖,𝑡|𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝛽3𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑊𝑖,𝑡|𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛  + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In table 3.5, coefficients on main variables of interest Downgrade CW and CW Resulting 
in Downgrade are not significantly different from zero in any specification. On the other hand, the 
successful resolution of the watch is important to the bond markets. Coefficients on Upgrade CW 
are positive in specifications (2) and (3), indicating an Average Daily Volume increase of about 
$0.423 million following credit watch for upgrade initiation, and Average Daily Volume per Bond 
increase of about $0.103 million. Upgrade CW is negative and significant in specifications (6) and 
(7) (Average Yield and Average Bond Trade Yield respective dependent variables) indicating 
reduction in future at-issuance coupons for the firm due to credit risk reduction, and the associated 
price drop. CW Resulting in Upgrade is negative in specifications (3) and (8) indicating a decline 
in Average Daily Volume Per Bond at credit watch announcement in anticipation of its resolution. 
Average Bond Trade Yield coefficient on CW Resulting in Upgrade is, similar to Upgrade CW, 
negative. 
Coefficients on sample sub period indicators Pre-Crisis and Crisis are in line with those 
reported in table 3.3, indicating that the trading activity is lower at the earlier part of the sample.  
Table 3.6 presents the main results of testing hypothesis 2 using the following marginal 
effects regression: 
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𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑊 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑊𝑖,𝑡|𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛 +
𝛽3𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑊𝑖,𝑡|𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑛 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In table 3.6 the interaction terms on credit watch and sub period sample indicators serve as 
variables of interest. Downgrade CW Pre-Crisis and Downgrade CW in Crisis both negatively 
influence Average Daily Volume (2) by $1.417 million and $2.217 million respectively. 
Downgrade CW Post-Crisis & Post DF is negative, though marginally significant in specification 
(2) as well. All in all, Average Daily Volume declines on the downgrade credit watch 
announcement, but the importance of the relation declines in later sub period samples. Downgrade 
CW in Crisis coefficient is also significant specifications (4), (5), and (8), indicating declines in 
trading activity, however no other sub period sample interaction variables are providing support 
hypothesis 2. Total Number of Trades (4) in all bonds of a firm put on downgrade credit watch 
declines by about 60 trades daily. Later in the sample the same relation does not hold. The 
coefficient on Downgrade CW Post-Crisis & Post DF is not significant at conventional levels, 
providing support for both hypotheses 2a and 2b. Average Number of Trades (5) in an average 
bond of a firm put on downgrade credit watch declines by about 6 trades daily in the 30 days 
following the event in Crisis sub period sample. The coefficient on Downgrade CW Post-Crisis & 
Post DF is yet again not significant, providing support for both hypotheses 2a and 2b of the decline 
in importance of credit watch procedures in post-crisis and post-regulatory change environment. 
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Conclusion 
 
Using the financial crisis and the subsequent tightening of regulatory oversight over Credit 
Rating Agency (CRA) industry, we investigate the changing influence of credit ratings updates 
and credit watch procedure on market reactions to credit downgrades pre- and post- the 2008 
financial crisis, and the July, 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.   
The results of analysis provide evidence to refute hypothesis 1a and 1b postulating lack of 
informativeness of credit downgrades in post-crisis and post Dodd-Frank environment 
respectively, as the downgrade events produce large reduction in daily trading volume ($32.96 
million in total trade volume, and $2.989 million on average) as compared to the robustness 
subsample. Additionally, post Dodd-Frank, reaction to credit upgrades and rating updates resulting 
in no changes (e.g. successful downgrade credit watch resolution, i.e. avoiding downgrade) are 
insignificant across all 9 regression specifications providing additional support to hypothesis 1b. 
We test hypothesis 1a, postulating lack of informativeness of credit downgrades, only on 
post-crisis post Dodd-Frank sub period sample, and not on post-crisis but pre Dodd-Frank, due to 
the lack of conditional observations in an isolated post-crisis and Pre Dodd-Frank sub period 
sample, however the effect of rating updates without changes in that period is significant across 
five different specifications testing for trading activity, producing the inconclusive results of 
testing hypothesis 1a.  
Both hypotheses 2a and 2b postulating the decline in importance of credit watch procedures 
in post-crisis and post-regulatory change environment find support in analysis results. Only the 
early sub period sample interaction variables have significant coefficients indicating the effect on 
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trading activity at an earlier parts of the sample. There exists, earlier on, a relation between credit 
watch procedure initiation and market activity, as it declines on the downgrade credit watch 
announcement, but the importance of the relation declines in later sub period samples. 
Overall results suggest that market reactions to credit ratings downgrades and downgrade 
credit watch initiation become less pronounced in later sub period samples in post-crisis and 
especially post Dodd-Frank environment. This dull reaction of bond markets can condition firms 
for and in part explain the higher level of debt issuance observed post crisis, corresponding to our 
Post-Crisis & Post Dodd-Frank sub period sample. 
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Table 3.1 
Sample statistics for bond trading activity for firms in the sample  
The table presents average bond trading activity, bond yields and bond prices for firms in the sample, as well as firm 
characteristics. Presented are means, standard deviation in parentheses. 
Panel A. Trading Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis & 
Pre Dodd-Frank 
Post-Crisis & 
Post Dodd-Frank 
Robustness 
Total Daily 
Volume 
64.85 57.49 67.96 81.02 69.26 62.06 
(123.5) (96.81) (141.8) (148.6) (132.5) (118.5) 
Average Daily 
Volume 
2.54 2.60 2.43 2.93 2.70 2.45 
(4.240) (3.431) (3.284) (4.138) (6.778) (3.748) 
Average Daily 
Volume Per Bond 
0.38 0.49 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.38 
(0.457) (0.626) (0.463) (0.455) (0.433) (0.442) 
Total Number of 
Trades 
242.60 191.77 315.33 368.82 292.78 215.21 
(476.7) (316.6) (626.8) (719.8) (557.4) (408.2) 
Average Number 
of Trades 
8.44 6.52 9.64 11.51 9.51 7.89 
(11.29) (6.559) (9.950) (13.86) (14.23) (10.52) 
Average Yield 3.05 -2.43 10.63 5.83 2.82 2.80 
(178.7) (707.6) (74.75) (6.299) (17.95) (10.84) 
Average Bond 
Trade Yield 
-0.09 -0.23 -0.25 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 
(7.047) (8.358) (1.474) (1.659) (9.835) (6.993) 
Average Price, % 
of Par 
104.61 99.60 91.53 101.86 107.52 105.59 
(8.488) (6.452) (13.51) (11.85) (7.002) (7.008) 
Average Period 
Return, % 
-7.75 -2.15 -1.70 -1.30 -0.97 -13.64 
(20.60) (7.597) (5.870) (4.657) (3.849) (26.81) 
N 
 
 
84,403 
 
 
5,167 2,676 8,966 10,078 57,266 
  
  
 
 
1
0
2
 
Table 3.1 – continued 
Panel B. Firm Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis Pre 
Dodd-Frank  
Post-Crisis 
Post Dodd-
Frank 
Robustness 
Market Capitalization, 
$ millions 
81,998.44 87,126.78 59,060.41 56,833.46 62,334.05 90,573.65 
(124941.6) (123085.6) (92911.0) (77633.3) (84953.4) (137516.3) 
Current Ratio 
1.71 1.35 1.41 1.64 1.79 1.75 
(1.391) (0.584) (0.682) (0.937) (1.241) (1.536) 
Quick Ratio 
1.36 0.95 1.00 1.28 1.45 1.42 
(1.418) (0.399) (0.450) (0.865) (1.223) (1.590) 
Return on Assets 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
(0.0170) (0.0138) (0.0206) (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0177) 
Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
0.68 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.68 
(0.178) (0.166) (0.169) (0.174) (0.175) (0.180) 
Cash and STIs  
to Assets Ratio 
0.14 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.15 
(0.143) (0.0795) (0.0816) (0.126) (0.144) (0.150) 
M&A Indicator 
0.58 0.57 0.64 0.56 0.61 0.58 
(0.493) (0.496) (0.480) (0.497) (0.489) (0.494) 
Net Change in LTD 
895.34 5515.22 6010.15 -765.48 -2308.68 1070.18 
(8389.9) (12990.5) (14862.3) (5191.6) (7734.0) (7538.5) 
Dividend Indicator  
0.86 0.81 0.82 0.76 0.76 0.90 
(0.352) (0.394) (0.382) (0.428) (0.427) (0.306) 
LTD Issuance 
Indicator 
0.75 0.81 0.90 0.78 0.75 0.73 
(0.433) (0.390) (0.306) (0.416) (0.432) (0.443) 
LTD due Next Year 
(% total LTD) 
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
(0.0398) (0.0242) (0.0134) (0.0157) (0.0292) (0.0446) 
Credit Rating 18.65 19.51 16.81 17.10 17.63 19.32 
(3.500) (3.825) (4.360) (6.376) (2.759) (2.512) 
N 80,459 5,212 2,693 9,020 9,970 53,564 
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Table 3.2 
Difference-in-means of bond trading activity for firms in the sample  
The table presents the difference-in-means of average bond trading activity, bond yields and 
bond prices for firms in the sample compared pairwise against the full sample. Presented are 
means, t-statistic for difference in means is in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
Panel A. Pre-Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 Full 
sample 
All Other 
Periods 
Pre-Crisis Difference 
in means  
 
 mean mean mean (2)-(3) t-stat 
Total Daily Volume 64.85 65.33 57.49 7.84*** (4.42) 
Average Daily Volume 2.54 2.53 2.60 -0.07 (-1.11) 
Average Daily Volume Per Bond 0.38 0.37 0.49 -0.12*** (-17.94) 
Total Number of Trades 242.60 245.93 191.77 54.16*** (7.91) 
Average Number of Trades 8.44 8.56 6.52 2.04*** (12.60) 
Average Yield 3.05 3.42 -2.43 5.85** (2.27) 
Average Bond Trade Yield -0.09 -0.08 -0.23 0.15 (1.41) 
Average Price, % of Par 104.61 104.94 99.60 5.33*** (44.25) 
Average Period Return, % -7.75 -8.32 -2.15 -6.17*** (-20.59) 
Average Credit Rating >BBB+ >BBB >BBB+ -0.93*** (-5.20) 
N 84,403 78,986 5,167 84,153  
 
Panel B. Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 
Full 
sample 
All Other 
Periods 
Crisis 
Difference 
in means  
 
 mean mean mean (2)-(3) t-stat 
Total Daily Volume 64.85 64.75 67.96 -3.21 -1.32 
Average Daily Volume 2.54 2.54 2.43 0.11 1.29 
Average Daily Volume Per Bond 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.04*** 4.06 
Total Number of Trades 242.60 240.22 315.33 -75.11*** -8.02 
Average Number of Trades 8.44 8.40 9.64 -1.24*** -5.59 
Average Yield 3.05 2.79 10.63 -7.83** -2.22 
Average Bond Trade Yield -0.09 -0.09 -0.25 0.16 1.17 
Average Price, % of Par 104.61 105.04 91.53 13.51*** 84.30 
Average Period Return, % -7.75 -8.06 -1.70 -6.36*** -15.60 
Average Credit Rating >BBB+ >BBB >BB+ 2.00*** 11.97 
N 84,403 81,477 2,676 84,153  
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Table 3.2 – continued  
Panel C. Post-Crisis & Pre-Regulatory Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 
Full 
sample 
All Other 
Periods 
Post-Crisis 
& Pre Dodd-
Frank 
Difference 
in means  
 
 mean mean mean (2)-(3) t-stat 
Total Daily Volume 64.85 62.92 81.02 -18.10*** -13.12 
Average Daily Volume 2.54 2.49 2.93 -0.44*** -9.27 
Average Daily Volume Per 
Bond 
0.38 0.38 0.37 0.01** 2.88 
T tal Number of Trades 242.60 227.55 368.82 -141.27*** -26.63 
Average Number of Trades 8.44 8.07 11.51 -3.43*** -27.34 
Average Yield 3.05 2.72 5.83 -3.11 -1.53 
Average Bond Trade Yield -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.06 
Average Price, % of Par 104.61 104.94 101.86 3.08*** 32.69 
Average Period Return, % -7.75 -8.98 -1.30 -7.68*** -32.65 
Average Credit Rating >BBB+ >BBB+ >BBB- 1.71*** 10.85 
N 84,403 75,187 89,66 84,153  
 
Panel D. Post-Crisis & Post-Regulatory Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 
Full 
sample 
All Other 
Periods 
Post-crisis & 
Post Dodd-
Frank 
Difference 
in means  
 
 mean mean mean (2)-(3) t-stat 
Total Daily Volume 64.85 64.25 69.26 -5.01*** -3.82 
Average Daily Volume 2.54 2.52 2.70 -0.18*** -4.02 
Average Daily Volume Per 
Bond 
0.38 0.38 0.34 0.04*** 8.49 
T tal Number of Trades 242.60 235.78 292.78 -57.00*** -11.27 
Average Number of Trades 8.44 8.29 9.51 -1.21*** -10.11 
Average Yield 3.05 3.08 2.82 0.26 0.13 
Average Bond Trade Yield -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -1.36 
Average Price, % of Par 104.61 104.21 107.52 -3.31*** -37.01 
Average Period Return % -7.75 -9.24 -0.97 -8.27*** -36.93 
Average Credit Rating >BBB+ >BBB >BBB- 1.22*** 10.01 
N 84,403 74,075 10,078 84,153  
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Table 3.2 – continued  
Panel E. Robustness sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 
Full 
sample 
All Other 
Periods 
Robustness 
Difference 
in means  
 
 mean mean mean (2)-(3) t-stat 
Total Daily Volume 64.85 70.80 62.06 8.73*** 9.56 
Average Daily Volume 2.54 2.73 2.45 0.28*** 9.02 
Average Daily Volume Per 
Bond 
0.38 0.38 0.38 -0.00 -0.13 
T tal Number of Trades 242.60 300.98 215.21 85.77*** 24.42 
Average Number of Trades 8.44 9.61 7.89 1.73*** 20.72 
Average Yield 3.05 3.57 2.80 0.77 0.57 
Average Bond Trade Yield -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 -0.35 
Average Price, % of Par 104.61 102.52 105.59 -3.07*** -49.60 
Average Period Return, % -7.75 -1.38 -13.64 12.26*** 73.65 
Average Credit Rating >BBB+ >BBB >BBB+ -1.64*** -18.14 
N 84,403 26,887 57,266 84,153  
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Table 3.2 – continued 
Panel F. Pairwise Differences between all sub period samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Pre-Crisis 
vs Crisis 
Post-Crisis 
&Pre Dodd- 
Frank vs 
Crisis 
Post-Crisis 
& Post 
Dodd- 
Frank vs 
Crisis 
Robustness 
vs Crisis 
Post-Crisis 
& Pre 
Dodd- 
Frank vs 
Pre-Crisis 
Post-Crisis 
& Post 
Dodd- 
Frank vs 
Pre-Crisis 
Robustness 
vs Pre-
Crisis 
Post-Crisis 
& Post 
Dodd- 
Frank vs 
Post-Crisis 
& Pre 
Dodd- 
Frank 
Robustness 
vs Post-
Crisis & Pre 
Dodd- 
Frank 
Robustness vs 
Post-Crisis & 
Post Dodd- 
Frank 
Total Daily 
Volume 
10.47*** 23.53*** 11.77*** 4.57** 13.06*** 1.30 -5.90* -11.76*** -18.96*** -7.20*** 
(3.849) (10.20) (5.656) (2.691) (4.031) (0.444) (-2.492) (-5.774) (-13.57) (-5.522) 
Average Daily 
Volume 
-0.17* 0.33*** 0.10 -0.15** 0.50*** 0.26 0.01 -0.23** -0.48*** -0.25*** 
(-2.080) (4.827) (0.952) (-2.844) (5.686) (1.947) (0.186) (-2.820) (-11.16) (-5.321) 
Average Daily 
Volume Per Bond 
-0.15*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 0.02* -0.00 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.01** 0.04*** 
(-10.63) (-13.50) (-16.92) (-16.51) (2.201) (-0.101) (4.046) (-3.593) (2.635) (7.654) 
Total Number of 
Trades 
123.56*** 177.06*** 101.01*** 23.44*** 53.49*** -22.55 -
100.12*** 
-76.04*** -
153.61*** 
-77.57*** 
(11.59) (16.76) (12.06) (4.019) (3.470) (-1.810) (-12.04) (-8.196) (-29.22) (-16.55) 
Average Number 
of Trades 
3.12*** 4.99*** 2.98*** 1.37*** 1.87*** -0.14 -1.75*** -2.00*** -3.62*** -1.62*** 
(16.60) (24.33) (14.30) (9.169) (6.486) (-0.462) (-8.437) (-9.810) (-28.89) (-13.42) 
Average Yield 13.06 8.26 5.25 5.23 -4.80
*** -7.81*** -7.83*** -3.01*** -3.02*** -0.02 
(0.946) (1.086) (0.723) (1.742) (-5.911) (-9.272) (-20.56) (-14.79) (-25.29) (-0.113) 
Average Bond 
Trade Yield 
-0.02 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.15*** 0.25 0.17 0.09 0.01 -0.08 
(-0.151) (1.367) (1.363) (1.286) (4.217) (1.276) (1.221) (0.873) (0.196) (-0.836) 
Average Price, % 
of Par 
-8.07*** 2.25*** 7.92*** 5.99*** 10.32*** 15.99*** 14.06*** 5.67*** 3.73*** -1.93*** 
(-35.77) (12.62) (67.84) (59.16) (38.23) (83.77) (95.74) (40.67) (41.92) (-25.53) 
Average Period 
Return, % 
0.45** 0.85*** 1.18*** -11.49*** 0.40*** 0.73*** -11.94*** 0.33*** -12.34*** -12.67*** 
(2.670) (8.220) (12.72) (-30.57) (3.649) (7.718) (-22.97) (5.377) (-43.35) (-47.24) 
Average Credit 
Rating 
-2.70*** -2.41*** -1.88*** -0.19 0.29 0.82*** 2.51*** 0.53* 2.22*** 1.69*** 
(-9.699) (-6.797) (-10.27) (-1.353) (0.816) (4.312) (18.20) (2.241) (14.48) (18.11) 
N 7,843 14,133 15,245 62,433 11,642 12,754 59,942 19,044 66,232 67,344 
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Table 3.3 
We use OLS to examine the impact of Credit Ratings Changes onto bond market trading activity, and trade yields and bond 
prices of the affected firms, controlling for firm-specific factors, 2008 financial crisis fixed effects, and the signing into law on 
July 21, 2010 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. T-statistics reported in parentheses are 
obtained from robust standard errors clustered by the firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels respectively. 
Panel A. All ratings changes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Total 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Per Bond 
Total 
Number 
of 
Trades 
Average 
Number 
of 
Trades 
Average 
Yield 
Average 
Bond 
Trade 
Yield 
Average 
Price, % 
of Par 
Average 
Period 
Return, % 
Credit Downgrade 
17.85** 1.323** 0.00748 32.48** 6.411 -0.175 -0.00975 -1.601** 0.453 
(2.49) (2.08) (0.26) (2.44) (1.32) (-0.15) (-0.08) (-2.27) (0.39) 
Credit Upgrade 
7.802** 0.724* -0.0186 20.61*** 2.047* 0.493 -0.0915 -0.354 -0.346 
(2.64) (1.91) (-0.56) (2.79) (1.74) (0.41) (-0.86) (-0.27) (-0.20) 
Market 
Capitalization 
0.167*** -0.858*** -0.621** 0.657*** -0.0180** 0.0180 -0.160*** -0.272 0.663 
(5.66) (-3.10) (-2.37) (5.26) (-2.34) (0.88) (-2.87) (-0.45) (1.11) 
Current Ratio 
20.54* 0.916 0.0740 40.35 -2.687 -4.525 -0.0410 4.055 0.431 
(1.78) (0.88) (0.80) (1.25) (-0.73) (-1.16) (-0.29) (1.48) (0.12) 
Quick Ratio 
-11.81 -0.895 -0.114 -16.02 3.316 5.594 0.0675 -5.300* 0.717 
(-0.87) (-0.81) (-1.21) (-0.42) (0.89) (1.41) (0.39) (-1.81) (0.19) 
Return on Assets 
-35.69 -3.007 -0.150 -206.6 -18.17 -2.620 -0.175 37.72** -12.95 
(-0.48) (-0.70) (-0.30) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.08) (-0.09) (2.21) (-0.83) 
Cash and STIs  
to Assets Ratio 
-34.93 2.350 0.592 -178.2** -0.303 -10.13* 0.635 7.212 -2.652 
(-1.15) (1.02) (1.51) (-2.10) (-0.03) (-1.89) (1.21) (0.99) (-0.36) 
M&A Indicator 
-1.912 -0.0801 -0.0166 -0.534 -0.162 -2.429 -0.298 0.284 0.0135 
(-1.05) (-0.61) (-0.78) (-0.17) (-0.47) (-1.08) (-1.27) (0.66) (0.02) 
Net Change in LTD 
0.276*** 0.514*** 0.0002 0.315** -0.128 -0.0105 -0.0211 -0.319 0.880** 
(4.01) (4.89) (0.88) (2.44) (-0.22) (-0.91) (-0.88) (-1.13) (2.46) 
Dividend Indicator 
2.494 0.0110 -0.148 8.092 2.315 -1.074 -0.163 -1.760 -0.804 
(0.75) (0.04) (-1.63) (0.72) (1.50) (-0.37) (-1.12) (-1.57) (-0.43) 
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Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
121.3** 5.263** 0.520** 197.4*** 16.12* 10.72 -1.420*** -13.09** 15.55*** 
(2.35) (2.53) (2.63) (4.04) (1.88) (1.00) (-2.97) (-2.69) (3.37) 
LTD Issuance 
Indicator 
-1.507 0.613* 0.0395* -5.654 0.590 0.0966 0.114 0.375 -1.727** 
(-0.75) (1.73) (1.95) (-1.00) (0.75) (0.12) (0.84) (0.67) (-2.40) 
LTD due Next Year 
49.34* 0.953 -0.269 257.6* 15.64 -10.28 0.571 -8.587 -9.541 
(1.84) (0.57) (-0.83) (1.86) (1.35) (-0.79) (0.41) (-1.25) (-0.62) 
Pre-Crisis 
-13.23* 0.464* 0.116** -44.16** -0.0927 -12.14 -0.167*** -8.749*** 13.26*** 
(-2.01) (1.86) (2.47) (-2.10) (-0.09) (-0.81) (-3.01) (-6.15) (10.90) 
Crisis 
-11.58 0.0187 -0.0820** 6.910 2.864** 4.552*** -0.205*** -15.10*** 13.85*** 
(-1.68) (0.06) (-2.68) (0.60) (2.19) (3.77) (-3.13) (-11.93) (11.75) 
Post-Crisis,       Pre 
Dodd-Frank 
-1.074 0.448 -0.0627 26.80* 4.448** 1.795 -0.167** -4.834*** 14.46*** 
(-0.39) (1.21) (-1.54) (1.74) (2.56) (1.38) (-2.17) (-7.34) (12.27) 
Post-Crisis, Post 
Dodd-Frank 
0.525 0.426 -0.0512 11.97 2.508 0.228 -0.0278 0.467 14.72*** 
(0.21) (0.83) (-1.48) (1.67) (1.53) (0.19) (-0.21) (0.66) (11.73) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 56,443 32,582 58,829 35,780 
adj. R2 0.137 0.022 0.019 0.175 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.084 
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Table 3.3 – continued 
Panel B. Ratings changes after credit watch 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Total 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Per Bond 
Total 
Number 
of 
Trades 
Average 
Number 
of 
Trades 
Average 
Yield 
Average 
Bond 
Trade 
Yield 
Average 
Price, % 
of Par 
Average 
Period 
Return, % 
Credit Downgrade 
34.21* 2.453* 0.0256 56.69* 13.23 0.460 0.160 -2.124 2.229 
(1.78) (1.81) (0.50) (1.80) (1.35) (0.75) (0.86) (-1.00) (1.29) 
Credit Downgrade 
after CW 
-32.49 -2.225 -0.0356 -47.93 -13.44 -1.262 -0.299 1.067 -3.108 
(-1.40) (-1.43) (-0.52) (-1.29) (-1.32) (-0.66) (-1.31) (0.35) (-1.52) 
Credit Upgrade 
4.105 0.826* -0.0155 17.59* 2.317 0.803 -0.0381 0.347 -0.158 
(1.62) (1.74) (-0.50) (1.88) (1.51) (0.65) (-0.42) (0.25) (-0.09) 
Credit Upgrade 
after CW 
14.87* -0.494 -0.0141 11.63 -1.497 -1.452 -0.479* -2.953** -1.463 
(1.72) (-0.75) (-0.20) (0.79) (-1.10) (-0.67) (-1.98) (-2.20) (-0.37) 
Pre-Crisis 
-13.12* 0.455* 0.116** -44.12** -0.131 -12.16 -0.171*** -8.778*** 13.24*** 
(-1.98) (1.81) (2.47) (-2.10) (-0.13) (-0.81) (-3.04) (-6.15) (10.92) 
Crisis 
-11.53 0.0158 -0.0821** 6.947 2.853** 4.546*** -0.206*** -15.11*** 13.85*** 
(-1.69) (0.05) (-2.68) (0.60) (2.23) (3.75) (-3.18) (-11.92) (11.75) 
Post-Crisis,       Pre 
Dodd-Frank 
-1.080 0.440 -0.0629 26.75* 4.409** 1.787 -0.170** -4.846*** 14.44*** 
(-0.39) (1.20) (-1.55) (1.74) (2.56) (1.36) (-2.20) (-7.35) (12.26) 
Post-Crisis, Post 
Dodd-Frank 
1.200 0.444 -0.0511 12.78* 2.648 0.222 -0.0293 0.400 14.73*** 
(0.52) (0.85) (-1.44) (1.84) (1.54) (0.18) (-0.22) (0.57) (11.75) 
Firm-Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 56,443 32,582 58,829 35,780 
adj. R2 0.140 0.023 0.019 0.176 0.049 -0.000 0.000 0.284 0.084 
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Table 3.4 
We use OLS to examine the impact of Credit Ratings changes on bond market trading activity, and trade yields and bond prices of the 
affected firms, controlling for firm-specific factors, 2008 financial crisis fixed effects, and the signing into law on July 21, 2010 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. T-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from robust standard 
errors clustered by the firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Total 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Per Bond 
Total 
Number 
of Trades 
Average 
Number 
of Trades 
Average 
Yield 
Average 
Bond 
Trade 
Yield 
Average 
Price, % 
of Par 
Average 
Period 
Return, % 
Credit Downgrade 
27.00** 2.157** 0.0293 42.79* 9.518 0.0329 0.162 -1.851 1.007 
(2.16) (2.18) (0.85) (1.89) (1.38) (0.04) (1.10) (-1.29) (0.50) 
Downgrade in Crisis 
-29.99*** -4.020*** -0.176*** -75.22*** -14.27** 4.923* -0.044 -2.233 0.855 
(-3.61) (-4.51) (-4.70) (-3.77) (-2.26) (2.02) (-0.26) (-1.30) (0.43) 
Downgrade Post-
Crisis & Post DF 
-32.96** -2.989** -0.0746 -37.69 -11.19 -0.695 -0.402 0.916 -1.309 
(-2.20) (-2.20) (-1.59) (-1.14) (-1.44) (-0.27) (-1.37) (0.31) (-0.60) 
Credit Upgrade  
6.963** 0.954* -0.0297 18.82** 2.595 -0.859 -0.037 -0.582 -0.556 
(2.25) (1.79) (-0.67) (2.18) (1.66) (-0.63) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.20) 
Upgrade Pre-Crisis 
19.77* -0.475 -0.111* 53.92** -0.0338 19 -0.128 0.255 -2.507 
(1.76) (-0.71) (-1.88) (2.08) (-0.01) (1.10) (-0.51) (0.13) (-0.88) 
Upgrade Post-Crisis 
& Post DF 
-1.441 -1.115 0.0747 -4.804 -3.105 2.185 -0.122 1.047 1.12 
(-0.30) (-1.41) (1.09) (-0.32) (-1.39) (0.79) (-0.58) (0.67) (0.39) 
No Change Rating 
Update Pre-Crisis 
14.89** 0.371 0.0627 38.45* 0.22 14.06 0.0158 -0.63 0.592 
(2.69) (1.04) (0.52) (1.98) (0.13) (0.95) (0.12) (-0.49) (0.80) 
No Change Rating 
Update in Crisis 
-2.37 -0.859** -0.0143 -35.43*** -1.391 2.07 -0.0319 -4.711* 0.0194 
(-0.32) (-2.08) (-0.39) (-3.13) (-1.08) (0.65) (-0.61) (-1.92) (0.02) 
No Change Update 
Post-Crisis & Pre-DF 
-4.292 2.312*** -0.0840** 210.1*** 56.34*** 1.003 0.0258 -15.41*** -1.921 
(-0.70) (5.05) (-2.25) (10.03) (42.93) (0.47) (0.31) (-15.45) (-1.59) 
No Change Update 
Post-Crisis & Post-DF 
1.378 1.106 0.0238 -18.86 0.0236 4.623 -0.0415 -0.164 0.93 
(0.25) (1.33) (0.32) (-1.30) (0.02) (1.67) (-0.31) (-0.14) (0.29) 
Market Capitalization 
0.169*** -0.836*** -0.621** 0.659*** -0.172** 0.177 -0.156*** -0.028 0.0666 
(5.73) (-2.98) (-2.35) (5.30) (-2.35) (0.87) (-2.87) (-0.47) (1.11) 
  
 
 
1
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Current Ratio 
19.64 0.824 0.0735 41.11 -3.2 -4.743 -0.0514 4.398 0.373 
(1.68) (0.77) (0.78) (1.25) (-0.84) (-1.21) (-0.35) (1.64) (0.10) 
Quick Ratio 
-11.16 -0.842 -0.113 -17.12 3.747 5.783 0.0686 -5.651* 0.773 
(-0.81) (-0.75) (-1.18) (-0.45) (0.98) (1.42) (0.39) (-1.94) (0.20) 
Return on Assets 
-33.81 -2.576 -0.144 -216.7 -18.04 -0.445 -0.143 37.21** -12.73 
(-0.44) (-0.59) (-0.29) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.01) (-0.07) (2.22) (-0.81) 
Cash and STIs to 
Assets Ratio  
-33.31 2.593 0.587 -175.3** 0.213 -9.901* 0.686 7.288 -2.779 
(-1.12) (1.14) (1.48) (-2.12) (0.02) (-1.80) (1.22) (0.99) (-0.37) 
M&A Indicator 
-2.029 -0.0885 -0.0158 -0.887 -0.172 -2.51 -0.297 0.262 0.0406 
(-1.09) (-0.68) (-0.76) (-0.29) (-0.50) (-1.09) (-1.24) (0.61) (0.07) 
Net Change in LTD 
0.269*** 0.471*** 0.0153 0.306** -0.305 -0.113 -0.022 -0.0319 0.843** 
(4.07) (4.34) (0.79) (2.35) (-0.47) (-0.90) (-0.90) (-1.13) (2.49) 
Dividend Indicator 
2.372 -0.0167 -0.146 8.021 2.192 -1.058 -0.166 -1.677 -0.769 
(0.73) (-0.07) (-1.61) (0.73) (1.41) (-0.37) (-1.14) (-1.50) (-0.40) 
Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
121.2** 5.145** 0.519** 198.4*** 15.70* 11.51 -1.435*** -12.96** 15.55*** 
(2.36) (2.50) (2.63) (4.01) (1.88) (1.02) (-3.07) (-2.66) (3.29) 
LTD Issuance 
Indicator 
-1.734 0.582* 0.0400* -5.987 0.478 0.027 0.11 0.423 -1.709** 
(-0.85) (1.71) (1.94) (-1.06) (0.64) (0.03) (0.80) (0.77) (-2.37) 
LTD due Next Year 
47.36* 0.439 -0.271 260.6* 15.05 -12.16 0.573 -8.472 -9.724 
(1.78) (0.30) (-0.84) (1.86) (1.34) (-0.91) (0.40) (-1.21) (-0.63) 
Pre-Crisis 
-14.01** 0.473* 0.117** -46.47** -0.0665 -12.96 -0.160** -8.735*** 13.30*** 
(-2.07) (1.82) (2.41) (-2.13) (-0.06) (-0.82) (-2.70) (-5.89) (10.99) 
Crisis 
-11.2 0.114 -0.0804** 9.524 3.070** 4.390*** -0.194*** -14.78*** 13.87*** 
(-1.55) (0.39) (-2.62) (0.82) (2.36) (4.02) (-3.09) (-11.42) (11.46) 
Post-Crisis & Pre 
Dodd-Frank 
-0.952 0.467 -0.0621 26.51* 4.457** 1.78 -0.161** -4.837*** 14.48*** 
(-0.35) (1.27) (-1.52) (1.72) (2.57) (1.35) (-2.17) (-7.35) (12.31) 
Post-Crisis & Post 
Dodd-Frank 
  
1.766 0.579 -0.0514 13.45* 3.027 0.198 -0.00739 0.396 14.72*** 
(0.79) (1.02) (-1.42) (1.94) (1.63) (0.15) (-0.05) (0.59) (11.88) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 56,443 32,582 58,829 35,780 
adj. R2 0.139 0.024 0.02 0.177 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.285 0.084 
  
 
 
1
1
2
 
Table 3.5 
We use OLS to examine the impact of CW initiation and resolution on bond market trading activity, and trade yields and bond prices 
of the affected firms, controlling for firm-specific factors, 2008 financial crisis fixed effects, and the signing into law on July 21, 2010 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. T-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from robust 
standard errors clustered by the firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Total 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Per Bond 
Total 
Number 
of Trades 
Average 
Number 
of Trades 
Average 
Yield 
Average 
Bond Trade 
Yield 
Average 
Price, % 
of Par 
Average 
Period 
Return, % 
Downgrade CW  
5.902 0.459 0.0402 2.476 0.854 2.707 -0.0789 -2.145 1.118 
(0.89) (1.09) (0.67) (0.19) (0.67) (1.19) (-0.98) (-1.69) (1.46) 
CW Resulting in 
Downgrade 
-2.130 -0.470 -0.0204 10.42 -1.267 -1.488 -0.153 0.320 -2.401 
(-0.21) (-0.80) (-0.34) (0.64) (-1.06) (-0.67) (-0.97) (0.24) (-1.36) 
Upgrade CW 
1.210 0.423** 0.103** -17.98 -0.117 -2.075*** -0.370** -0.960 1.130 
(0.23) (2.05) (2.38) (-1.41) (-0.11) (-6.67) (-2.56) (-0.86) (0.67) 
CW Resulting in 
Upgrade 
-15.15 -0.436 -0.187*** 29.70 4.303 -1.998*** -0.288 -0.750 1.420 
(-1.07) (-0.90) (-3.04) (0.96) (1.14) (-5.95) (-1.38) (-0.24) (0.24) 
Market 
Capitalization 
0.168*** -0.850*** -0.629** 0.661*** -0.177** 0.173 -0.161*** -0.264 0.660 
(5.66) (-3.06) (-2.40) (5.30) (-2.29) (0.87) (-2.89) (-0.44) (1.10) 
Current Ratio 
19.40* 0.895 0.0643 41.33 -2.333 -4.817 -0.0325 4.190 0.492 
(1.68) (0.84) (0.66) (1.30) (-0.61) (-1.22) (-0.22) (1.58) (0.14) 
Quick Ratio 
-10.64 -0.881 -0.103 -17.18 2.934 5.873 0.0572 -5.451* 0.644 
(-0.78) (-0.78) (-1.05) (-0.46) (0.75) (1.45) (0.33) (-1.91) (0.18) 
Return on Assets 
-40.20 -3.225 -0.172 -205.3 -19.33 -2.900 -0.263 37.77** -13.45 
(-0.54) (-0.71) (-0.35) (-0.64) (-0.66) (-0.09) (-0.13) (2.13) (-0.87) 
Cash and STIs  
to Assets Ratio 
-32.64 2.562 0.587 -172.4* 0.360 -9.692* 0.641 7.239 -2.919 
(-1.05) (1.10) (1.50) (-2.01) (0.04) (-1.84) (1.25) (1.00) (-0.39) 
M&A Indicator 
-2.304 -0.101 -0.0166 -1.034 -0.186 -2.310 -0.300 0.278 0.0503 
(-1.21) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.33) (-0.51) (-1.08) (-1.27) (0.63) (0.10) 
Net Change in LTD 
2.82*** 5.38*** 1.99 3.18** -0.877 -1.03 -2.14 -3.55 0.872** 
(4.01) (4.41) (1.01) (2.51) (-0.17) (-0.88) (-0.89) (-1.24) (2.44) 
Dividend Indicator 2.516 -0.00149 -0.147 7.694 2.147 -0.959 -0.165 -1.673 -0.916 
  
 
 
1
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(0.74) (-0.01) (-1.60) (0.70) (1.46) (-0.35) (-1.15) (-1.50) (-0.48) 
Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
117.8** 4.991** 0.525** 190.2*** 14.99* 11.61 -1.420*** -13.04** 15.50*** 
(2.31) (2.41) (2.65) (3.78) (1.85) (1.02) (-2.84) (-2.67) (3.33) 
LTD Issuance 
Indicator 
-1.611 0.603* 0.0388* -5.763 0.568 0.450 0.120 0.414 -1.724** 
(-0.74) (1.70) (1.88) (-1.01) (0.73) (0.00) (0.91) (0.74) (-2.42) 
LTD due Next Year 
43.52 0.574 -0.286 253.6* 14.86 -12.56 0.526 -8.713 -9.166 
(1.57) (0.33) (-0.88) (1.81) (1.27) (-0.96) (0.39) (-1.29) (-0.61) 
Pre-Crisis 
-14.09** 0.406 0.115** -45.53** -0.317 -12.09 -0.165*** -8.685*** 13.27*** 
(-2.06) (1.57) (2.45) (-2.14) (-0.29) (-0.81) (-3.15) (-6.09) (11.12) 
Crisis 
-12.76* -0.0708 -0.0841*** 5.377 2.556** 4.460*** -0.202*** -14.96*** 13.80*** 
(-1.73) (-0.23) (-2.82) (0.47) (2.00) (3.98) (-3.17) (-11.80) (11.75) 
Post-Crisis, Pre 
Dodd-Frank 
-1.806 0.389 -0.0618 25.39 4.199** 1.866 -0.168** -4.837*** 14.49*** 
(-0.64) (1.07) (-1.52) (1.64) (2.46) (1.46) (-2.29) (-7.18) (12.40) 
Post-Crisis, Post 
Dodd-Frank 
0.764 0.457 -0.0516 12.28 2.651 0.263 -0.0220 0.465 14.80*** 
(0.31) (0.87) (-1.48) (1.72) (1.57) (0.22) (-0.17) (0.67) (11.86) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 56,443 32,582 58,829 35,780 
adj. R2 0.135 0.019 0.020 0.172 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.284 0.084 
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Table 3.6 
We use OLS to examine the impact of CW initiation and resolution on bond market trading activity, and trade yields and bond prices of 
the affected firms, controlling for firm-specific factors, 2008 financial crisis fixed effects, and the signing into law on July 21, 2010 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. T-statistics reported in parentheses are obtained from robust standard 
errors clustered by the firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Total 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume 
Average 
Daily 
Volume Per 
Bond 
Total 
Number of 
Trades 
Average 
Number of 
Trades 
Average 
Yield 
Average 
Bond Trade 
Yield 
Average 
Price, % 
of Par 
Average 
Period 
Return, % 
Downgrade CW  10.64 1.168
** 0.0805 13.67 2.387* 0.801 -0.145 -3.715*** 2.176 
(1.28) (2.35) (1.20) (0.98) (1.75) (0.44) (-1.03) (-4.18) (1.44) 
Downgrade CW 
Pre-Crisis 
-6.577 -1.417*** -0.0733 23.95 -0.262 16.71 0.110 1.562 0.515 
(-0.79) (-2.81) (-0.52) (1.02) (-0.20) (1.10) (1.11) (1.06) (0.14) 
Downgrade CW in 
Crisis 
-16.17 -2.217*** -0.130 -59.75** -6.309*** -0.760 0.113 -5.772** -3.110 
(-1.62) (-3.56) (-1.38) (-2.66) (-3.32) (-0.21) (0.72) (-2.65) (-1.64) 
Downgrade CW 
Post-Crisis & Post 
DF 
 
-17.50 -1.712* -0.0972 -9.503 -2.473 -1.592 -0.222 2.894 1.273 
(-1.33) (-1.75) (-1.32) (-0.46) (-1.20) (-0.75) (-1.01) (1.59) (0.25) 
Upgrade CW 
1.142 0.434** 0.104** -18.14 -0.0816 20.74*** -0.367** -0.989 1.069 
(0.22) (2.10) (2.38) (-1.40) (-0.07) (6.70) (-2.57) (-0.88) (0.64) 
Upgrade CW Post-
Crisis & Post DF 
22.98 -1.041 -0.0769 21.06 -5.727   3.998 4.496 
(1.67) (-1.52) (-0.84) (0.49) (-1.26)   (1.24) (0.70) 
Post-CW  
Upgrade 
-16.59 -0.346 -0.180*** 28.63 4.748 -19.90*** 0.287 -1.071 0.848 
(-1.10) (-0.69) (-2.82) (0.87) (1.18) (-5.86) (1.39) (-0.32) (0.12) 
Post-CW 
Downgrade 
1.694 -0.278 -0.0103 1.393 -1.675* -0.458 0.0462 0.451 -4.317 
(0.11) (-0.37) (-0.15) (0.07) (-1.73) (-0.35) (0.22) (0.49) (-1.06) 
Market 
Capitalization 
0.169*** -0.849*** -0.628** 0.661*** -0.177** 0.175 -0.161*** -0.266 0.652 
(5.75) (-3.04) (-2.40) (5.31) (-2.29) (0.88) (-2.88) (-0.44) (1.08) 
Current Ratio 
19.16 0.874 0.0634 42.55 -2.265 -4.454 -0.0363 4.170 0.570 
(1.67) (0.81) (0.65) (1.34) (-0.59) (-1.06) (-0.24) (1.56) (0.16) 
Quick Ratio 
-10.40 -0.868 -0.103 -18.61 2.826 5.432 0.0603 -5.402* 0.561 
(-0.76) (-0.76) (-1.04) (-0.50) (0.72) (1.26) (0.34) (-1.88) (0.15) 
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Return on Assets 
-36.71 -2.981 -0.157 -192.2 -18.41 -0.423 -0.235 37.01** -12.83 
(-0.50) (-0.67) (-0.32) (-0.61) (-0.63) (-0.01) (-0.12) (2.15) (-0.84) 
Cash and STIs  
to Assets Ratio 
-32.57 2.641 0.592 -171.1* 0.702 -8.805 0.670 6.986 -3.057 
(-1.05) (1.13) (1.51) (-2.00) (0.07) (-1.68) (1.28) (0.97) (-0.41) 
M&A Indicator 
-2.407 -0.117 -0.0175 -1.357 -0.223 -2.246 -0.297 0.316 0.0127 
(-1.27) (-0.94) (-0.81) (-0.43) (-0.62) (-1.08) (-1.26) (0.73) (0.02) 
Net Change in LTD 
0.281*** 0.525*** 0.0190 0.317** -0.17 -0.112 -0.0217 -0.0328 0.0893** 
(4.00) (4.32) (0.98) (2.50) (-0.22) (-0.90) (-0.90) (-1.13) (2.35) 
Dividend Indicator 
2.434 -0.0009 -0.147 7.743 2.163 -0.988 -0.166 -1.683 -0.914 
(0.71) (-0.00) (-1.61) (0.70) (1.47) (-0.36) (-1.16) (-1.51) (-0.48) 
Liabilities-to-Assets 
Ratio 
118.6** 5.096** 0.531** 192.3*** 15.24* 11.54 -1.421*** -13.29** 15.60*** 
(2.34) (2.49) (2.68) (3.87) (1.87) (1.02) (-2.83) (-2.71) (3.34) 
LTD Issuance 
Indicator 
-1.462 0.618* 0.0397* -5.676 0.589 -0.00143 0.121 0.388 -1.730** 
(-0.68) (1.73) (1.93) (-1.01) (0.76) (-0.00) (0.92) (0.68) (-2.42) 
LTD due Next Year 
45.05 0.556 -0.288 256.0* 14.68 -12.51 0.523 -8.606 -8.808 
(1.63) (0.32) (-0.89) (1.81) (1.27) (-0.96) (0.38) (-1.28) (-0.59) 
Pre-Crisis 
-14.04* 0.438 0.117** -46.63** -0.340 -12.70 -0.170*** -8.705*** 13.24*** 
(-2.01) (1.66) (2.50) (-2.14) (-0.31) (-0.83) (-3.13) (-5.93) (11.12) 
Crisis 
-11.91 0.0438 -0.0773** 8.657 2.897** 4.583*** -0.205*** -15.26*** 13.93*** 
(-1.59) (0.15) (-2.46) (0.75) (2.25) (4.24) (-3.19) (-11.55) (11.88) 
Post-Crisis & Pre 
Dodd-Frank 
-1.709 0.402 -0.0611 25.41 4.215** 1.799 -0.168** -4.859*** 14.48*** 
(-0.61) (1.10) (-1.49) (1.64) (2.47) (1.38) (-2.29) (-7.18) (12.51) 
Post-Crisis & Post 
Dodd-Frank 
1.191 0.510 -0.0485 12.62* 2.749 0.316 -0.0177 0.363 14.77*** 
(0.53) (0.95) (-1.38) (1.78) (1.58) (0.25) (-0.13) (0.52) (12.16) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 58,829 56,443 32582 58829 35780 
adj. R2 0.136 0.020 0.020 0.173 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.084 
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FIGURE 3.1. SAMPLE TIME LINE  
 
Sample time line (Calendar quarter, year) 
                                        Post-Crisis & Pre    Post-Crisis & Post            Post-crisis & Post  
         Pre-Crisis          Crisis        Dodd-Frank             Dodd-Frank  DF Robustness 
 
 
Q1                        Q3 Q1 Q3                       Q1       Q1 Q3 
2007                      2008    2009 2010                       2012    2015 2016 
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APPENDIX A. BLOOMBERG GOVERNANCE INDEX COMPOSITION 
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Table A. 
The governance portion of Bloomberg ESG rating covers seven major areas, with various fields detailed below in each area, for a total 
of 37 equally weighted field contributions to the final governance rating: 
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Field values are sorted in ascending or descending order depending on whether a high or a 
low field value is preferred, within each   Bloomberg Industry Classification Systems (BICS) 
category, and the field rank is assigned by multiplying the difference between the total number of 
BICS peers plus one and the given company’s list rank by the percentile step size. The percentile 
step size is calculated as one hundred over the number of companies within each BICS category 
out of the ones that are being analyzed. I.e. the resulting ranking is the percentile the company is 
at, benchmarked against all the industry peers in each individual field. If no data is available for a 
given field, a rank of zero is assigned. All the field ranks are then equally weighted and their 
contributions summed for the final governance ranking. 
For various fields, various data outcomes are preferred from the governance perspective. 
The last row of table A presents the preferred outcomes for each field variable. The legend is as 
follows: 
1. D_MEDIAN(D_FIXED) – Low deviation from the sector median (fixed median) is 
preferred. 
2. H_VAL(L_VAL) – High Value (Low Value) is preferred. 
3. Y(N) – Policy in place (not in place) is preferred.  
 
  
120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B. LIST OF RESTRICTIVE BOND COVENANTS 
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Negative Pledge, also known as Limitation on Liens: “Agilent will not, and will not permit 
any subsidiary to, create, incur, assume or permit to exist any lien on (i) any Principal Property or 
(ii) the capital stock of any subsidiary, to secure any indebtedness of Agilent, any subsidiary or 
any other person without securing the debt securities equally and ratably with such indebtedness 
for so long as such indebtedness shall be so secured, subject to certain exceptions.” 
Change of Control: “If a change of control repurchase event occurs, unless Agilent has 
exercised its right to redeem the notes as described above, Agilent will be required to make an 
offer to each holder of the notes to repurchase all or any part (in excess of $2,000 and in integral 
multiples of $1,000) of that holder's notes at a repurchase price in cash equal to 101% of the 
aggregate principal amount of the notes repurchased plus any accrued and unpaid interest on the 
notes repurchased to, but not including, the date of repurchase.” 
Fundamental Change clauses prohibit the borrower and other loan parties from merging, 
liquidating, or disposing of assets, with exceptions for carve-outs or baskets. 
Limit of Indebtedness covenant limits additional debt which may be incurred by the issuer, 
with a goal of protecting current lenders. 
Cross Default: “Each of the following constitutes an event of default under the form of 
indenture with respect to any series of debt securities: … default under any mortgage, indenture or 
instrument under which there may be issued or by which there may be secured or evidenced any 
indebtedness for money borrowed by AWCC or American Water (or the payment of which is 
guaranteed by AWCC or American Water), if that default is caused by a failure to pay principal at 
its stated maturity after giving effect to any applicable grace period, or results in the acceleration 
of such indebtedness prior to its stated maturity…” 
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Negative Covenants (incl. Certain Sales of Assets) are any covenants that require the issuer 
to abstain from a specific action, such as selling certain assets. 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio and/or Free Cash Flow to Debt Service Ratio covenants 
require the issuer to maintain a certain level of operating profitability in order to meet interest 
payment obligations. 
Restrictive Covenants are any covenants that require the issuer to cease or avoid doing 
something, such as mergers activity, subsidiary debt issuance or dividend payments. 
Restriction on Activities including, but not limited to Merger Restrictions: “Agilent may 
not consolidate or merge with or into another entity, or sell, lease, convey, transfer or otherwise 
dispose of its property and assets substantially as an entirety to another entity unless…” 
Limitation on Sale-and-Leaseback “Agilent will not, and will not permit any subsidiary to, 
enter into any arrangement with any person pursuant to which Agilent or any subsidiary leases any 
property that has been or is to be sold or transferred by Agilent or the subsidiary to such person (a 
"sale and leaseback transaction"), except that a sale and leaseback transaction is permitted if 
Agilent or such subsidiary would be entitled to incur indebtedness secured by a lien on the property 
to be leased (without equally and ratably securing the outstanding debt securities of any series) in 
an amount equal to the present value of the lease payments with respect to the term of the lease 
remaining on the date as of which the amount is being determined, discounted at the rate of interest 
set forth or implicit in the terms of the lease, compounded semi-annually (such amount is referred 
to as the "attributable debt").” 
Limitation on Subsidiary Debt: “Agilent may from time to time, without notice to or the 
consent of the holders of the debt securities of any series, create and issue additional debt securities 
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having the same terms as, and ranking equally and ratably with, the debt securities of such series 
in all respects (except for the issue date and, if applicable, the payment of interest accruing prior 
to the issue date of such additional debt securities and the first payment of interest following the 
issue date of such additional debt securities). Such additional debt securities may be consolidated 
and form a single series with, and will have the same terms as to ranking, redemption, waivers, 
amendments or otherwise, as a previously issued series of debt securities and will vote together as 
one class on all matters with respect to such debt securities.” 
Restricted Payments covenants require that the issuer restricts dividend payment to equity 
holders in the event that certain level of operating profitability sufficient for meeting interest 
obligations is not achieved. 
Ratings Trigger: “…Ratings Trigger shall mean any provision in any document applicable 
to any Indebtedness of the Borrower or any Subsidiary stating that if the Borrower or any 
Subsidiary shall not maintain a minimum debt rating by S&P, Moodys or any other ratings agency: 
(i) the Borrower or such Subsidiary shall be deemed not to have complied with such document, 
(ii) a default or event of default or other acceleration event shall be deemed to have occurred under 
such document, or (iii) Indebtedness governed by such document shall be prepaid or the holder of 
such Indebtedness shall have the option to require such prepayment (whether immediately or with 
the giving of notice, passage of time or both).” 
Collective Action Clause: “The holders of at least a majority in aggregate principal amount 
of the outstanding debt securities may waive compliance by Agilent with certain restrictive 
provisions of the indenture with respect to the debt securities. The holders of at least a majority in 
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt securities may waive any past default under 
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the indenture, except a default not theretofore cured in the payment of principal or interest and 
certain covenants and provisions of the indenture which cannot be amended without the consent 
of the holder of each outstanding debt security.” 
Material Adverse Change Clause: “If there occurs a material adverse change in Borrowers 
prospects, business or financial condition, or if there is a material impairment in the prospect of 
repayment of any portion of the Obligations or a material impairment in the perfection, value or 
priority of security interests in the Collateral…” 
Force Majeure: “In no event shall the Borrower be responsible or liable for any failure or 
delay in the performance of its obligations hereunder arising out of or caused by, directly or 
indirectly, forces beyond its control, including, without limitation, strikes, work stoppages, 
accidents, acts of war or terrorism, civil or military disturbances, nuclear or natural catastrophes 
or acts of God, and interruptions, loss or malfunctions of utilities, communications or computer 
(software and hardware) services...” 
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